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else by name. Although the testator neglected to affirmatively bequeath his property to his stepchildren, the will clearly
expresses by negative implication his intent
to leave his property to them.
Implying a gift to the testator's stepchildren in this case effectuates his intent and
avoids disposing of his assets through intestacy. Consequently, I am persuaded
that the testator's assets should pass under
the will to his four stepchildren.
STEWART, J., concurs in the concurring
and dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring and
Dissenting)
I would dismiss the appeal.
Hunt quite plainly brought this appeal in
hit capacity as personal representative of
tlie estate. That much is clear from the
notice of appeal filed by "Richard L. Hunt,
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Reed Dwane Hunt" on October 6, 1989.
Hunt then resigned as personal representative of the estate on November 9, 1989.
No one has moved to substitute a successor
personal representative as appellant in this
appeal. Thus, there has been a failure to
substitute parties pursuant to rule 38(b) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Utah R.App.P. 38(b).
Whatever standing to pursue this appeal
Richard L. Hunt as an individual heir might
have, see Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768
P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989); Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d
1166, 1170-77 (Utah 1987); Terracor v.
Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796,
798-99 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675
P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983); Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah
1982); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443
(Utah 1978), acting as an individual, he is a
separate entity from Richard L. Hunt, a
personal representative. In light of his
t.

I agree with the majority that even if Hunt
had not resigned as personal representative, he
would have had difficulty establishing standing
to bring an appeal acting in that capacity. A
personal representative is barred from appealing where the issue on appeal concerns a dispute between the decedent's heirs and the distri-

resignation as personal representative,
Hunt has no authority to prosecute this
appeal as personal representative, and
Hunt, as an individual, filed no notice of
appeal in this action. Therefore, Hunt has
no standing to pursue this appeal. 1
The majority relies on rule 61 of the civil
rules as a ground for treating as surplusage Hunt's designation of his status as
"personal representative" in the notice of
appeal. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. This is a
plain misuse of the rule. The capacity in
which one consciously takes an appeal is
hardly "surplusage." And as the majority
candidly notes, as a personal representative, Hunt almost certainly lacked standing.
Standing, of course, is an issue that is
never waived and can be raised by any
party or by the court at any time. See
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 798;
Stromquist,
646 P.2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d
1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v.
Zions First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904
(Utah CtApp.1988).
If I were to reach the merits, however, I
would affirm.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
No. 910150.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 6, 1092.
Utah State Tax Commission determined that railroad owed sales and use
bution requested docs not benefit the estate.
See In re Yonks Estate. 115 Utah 292. 302. 204
P.2d 452. 458 (1949) Sec generally PG Guthrie. Annotation, Right of Executor or Administrator to Appeal from Order Granting or Denying
Distribution, 16 A.L.R.3d 1274. 1276-1300(1967
& Supp.1992)

taxes on certain purchases and services.
Railroad petitioned for review. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
railroad owed sales and use tax on its instate purchases of diesel fuel and ballast
even though railroad transported materials
for its own use outside Utah, and (2) railroad owed sales in use tax on some, but not
all, services performed in Oregon on railroad's cross ties.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<S=>390
Because courts should uphold agency
rules if they are reasonable and rational,
court should also uphold reasonable and
rational departures from those rules absent
showing that departure violated some other
right.
2. Taxation <£=>1233
Railroad's purchases of fuel and ballast transported for its use outside Utah
were not exempt from sales and use tax
under exemption for Tax Commission's rule
on interstate commerce for sales in which
seller is obligated to physically deliver
property across state boundary line to buyer; evidence showed that physical delivery
occurred in Utah when vendors loaded fuel
and ballast on railroad's cars and that vendors had no obligation to deliver fuel or
ballast out of state.
3. Taxation <S=»1233
Railroad's purchases of fuel and ballast transported for railroad's use outside
Utah was not exempt from Tax Commission's rule on interstate commerce under
exemption pursuant to which common carrier is deemed agent of vendor where delivery is made by seller to common carrier for
transportation to buyer outside Utah; railroad took delivery of fuel and ballast in
capacity of purchaser and consumer and
not in capacity of common carrier.
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
®=763
Supreme Court applies no-deference
correction-of-error standard to review

claims of unconstitutional agency action
under statute providing that appellate
court may grant relief if agency action, or
statute or rule on which agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(a).
5. Commerce <s=374.5(2)
Taxation <3=>1285
Including costs of services performed
in Oregon in basis of Utah use tax imposed
on railroad's cross ties did not in itself
impose burden on interstate commerce.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
6. Commerce «s=»71
Commerce clause permits state to tax
property which has become part of common
mass of property within state. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
7. Commerce «=>74.5(1)
Commerce clause does not prohibit
state from including price of services performed in manufacture of tangible property in calculating basis for use tax levy.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Taxation <s=>1285
When state bases use tax on selling
price of item of tangible property, basis
necessarily includes cost of services because seller incorporates costs of services
into selling price. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.
9. Taxation <fc*1285
State may include cost of services performed in connection with tangible personal property that taxpayer already owns in
calculating basis for use tax.
10. Commerce <s=>74.5(l)
Although state may include price of
services performed in connection with
tangible property in calculating basis for
use tax, it cannot impose tax which discriminates
against
interstate
commerce.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
11. Taxation <S=»1285
In order for state to include out-ofstate services in basis for calculating use
tax, Constitution requires that those services be taxable if performed within state.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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12. Commerce <5=»74.5(1)
If applied correctly, Utah Sales and
Use Tax Act does not discriminate against
interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const. Art.
1, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Commerce e=74.5(l)
In reviewing construction and application of Utah Sales and Tax Act in context
of interstate commerce challenge, Supreme
Court will uphold imposition of use tax on
tangible property imported from out of
state only if state could have taxed involved transactions if they had occurred
within state. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3.
14. Taxation <s=»1234
Under Utah Sales and Use Tax Act,
railroad was liable for sales and use tax on
creosote treatment applied by independent
contractor in Oregon to logs shipped by
railroad in preparation for their use as
cross ties; creosote treatment involved applying tangible personal property, i.e., creosote, to other tangible personal property,
i.e., cross ties. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-103.
15. Taxation <s=»1234
Railroad was not required to pay use
tax for amount paid to independent contractor in Oregon for milling logs into uniform size for use as cross ties and for
drilling spike holes, which services were
performed independently from sale of ties
themselves; drilling and milling services
were not "repairs or renovations" of tangible personal property. U.C.A.1953, 59-12103(l)(g).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
16. Taxation <3=>1319
Court would not address portion of
Tax Commission's order which agreed with
auditing division that railroad improperly
charged and collected sales tax on only
9.82% of total repair bill for American Association of Railroads (AAR) repairs it performed in Utah, but that railroad owed no
tax deficiency in light of its long-standing
practice of using that formula, which was
uncorrected by several audits; Commission
1. Gravel or broken stone laid in a railroad bed

had not yet audited or assessed tax deficiency against railroad.
Robert A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for
Union Pacific.
R. Paul Van Dam, Rick Carlton, Salt
Lake City, for Tax Com'n.
DURHAM, Justice:
In proceedings before the Utah State Tax
Commission, Union Pacific Railroad Company sought relief from a sales and use tax
deficiency order imposed against it by the
Auditing Division of the Commission After a formal hearing, the Commission determined that (1) Union Pacific owed sales
and use tax on its in-state purchases of
diesel fuel and ballast' even though Union
Pacific transported the materials for its
own use outside of Utah; (2) Union Pacific
owed sales and use tax on certain services
performed in Oregon on cross ties (commonly known as railroad ties) it owned;
and (3) in the future, the Commission may
assess a sales tax on the full cost of repair
services Union Pacific performs on the railcars of other carriers. Union Pacific now
seeks review of these determinations. It
also challenges the Auditing Division's imposition of a penalty on the deficiency. We
affirm the first determination, reverse the
second, and decline to review the third.
We also vacate the imposition of the penalty and remand the issue for further review
by the Commission.
Because the issues have different factual
backgrounds and standards of review, we
set forth the facts and standard of review
separately for each issue.
I

TAXABILITY OF IN-STATE PURCHASES OF BALLAST AND FUEL
USED OUTSIDE UTAH
Union Pacific, through its fuel division
located in Omaha, Nebraska, arranged to
purchase diesel fuel from Amoco's Salt
Lake City operation. Amoco loaded the
fuel into Union Pacific tank cars and
turned them over to Union Pacific at the

railhead. Amoco's sales invoice specifies
that Amoco delivered the fuel f.o.b. at
Amoco's Salt Lake City operation and that
a common carrier shipped the fuel. Union
Pacific produced "waybill" 2 summaries indicating the destination of each tank car of
fuel.
Union Pacific also generated waybills
showing the destination of each railcar load
of ballast purchased from three Utah vendors. The vendors, MONROC, RME, and
UP Resources, loaded the ballast into Union Pacific railcars, and Union Pacific then
transported the ballast to its ultimate destination. One sales invoice for the purchase
of ballast between MONROC and Union
Pacific states, "It is hereby agreed that
sale is consummated & title passes at plant
site." The record does not include invoices
or purchase agreements between RME or
UP Resources and Union Pacific.
Union Pacific did not pay sales tax on the
portion of ballast it transported for its own
use outside Utah on purchases from two of
the three Utah ballast vendors. Nor did
Union Pacific pay sales tax on the portion
of the in-state diesel fuel purchases that it
transported for its own use outside Utah.
The Commission upheld a deficiency order
against Union Pacific for sales and use
taxes on these purchases. Union Pacific
claims that the Commission's rules on interstate sales exempt these purchases. See
Utah Admin.R. 865-19-44S.
Section 16 of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) governs the standard of review in this matter. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16. Because Union Pacific
claims that the Commission's decision does
not comport with the Commission's interstate sales rule, possible grounds for relief
include section 63-46b-16, subsections 4(a)
and 4(h)(ii). Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) provides for judicial relief if the "rule on
which [an] agency action is based[] is unconstitutional on its face or as applied."
Subsection (4)(h)(ii) provides for judicial relief if agency action is "contrary to a rule
of the agency." Union Pacific did not chal2. The record indicates that a waybill is a document generated internally by Union Pacific to
direct the route of freight cars and is distin-

lenge the constitutionality of the Commission's rule or its application. We therefore
conclude that Union Pacific bases this
claim on subsection (4)(h)(ii).
[1] Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) refers to
rules promulgated by the agency itself.
Because courts should uphold agency rules
if they are reasonable and rational, see
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988), courts should also
uphold reasonable and rational departures
from those rules absent a showing that the
departure violated some other right. We
will thus employ an intermediate standard
(one of some, but not total, deference) in
reviewing Union Pacific's claim that the
Commission erred in applying its rules.
Union Pacific argues that the Commission's decision to assess sales tax on Union
Pacific's purchases of fuel and ballast
transported for Union Pacific's use outside
of Utah does not comport with the Commission's rule on interstate commerce, codified
at Utah Admin.R. 865-19-44S (rule 44S).
The rule reads as follows:
A. Sales made in interstate commerce
are not subject to the sales tax imposed.
However, the mere fact that commodities
purchased in Utah are transported beyond its boundaries is not enough to constitute the transaction of a sale in interstate commerce. When the commodity is
delivered to the buyer in this state, even
though the buyer is not a resident of the
state and intends to transport the property to a point outside the state, the sale is
not in interstate commerce and is subject
to tax.
B. Before a sale qualifies as a sale
made in interstate commerce, the following must be complied with:
1. the transaction must involve actual
and physical movement of the property
sold across the state line;
2. such movement must be an essential and not an incidental part of the sale;
3. the seller must be obligated by the
express or unavoidable implied terms of
the sale, or contract to sell, to make
guishable from a bill of lading, which is a contractual document with the vendor.
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physical delivery of the property across a
state boundary line to the buyerf.]
C. Where delivery is made by the seller to a common carrier for transportation
to the buyer outside the state of Utah,
the common carrier is deemed to be the
agent of the vendor for the purposes of
this section regardless of who is responsible for the payment of the freight
charges.
Subsection A makes clear that the mere
fact that Union Pacific transported the fuel
and ballast out of Utah does not qualify the
purchases for the interstate sales exemption. Therefore, Union Pacific must look to
subsections B and C to exempt the fuel and
ballast purchases.

(3] Subsection C presents the question
of whether Union Pacific should qualify for
the exemption because of its status as a
common carrier. All railroad companies
are common carriers under the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. XII, § 12. Union Pacific argues that because subsection
C treats a common carrier as "the agent of
the vendor," when a common carrier delivers material out of Utah it is the equivalent
of the vendor's making direct delivery to
the out-of-state purchaser. The Commission rejected this contention, holding that
Union Pacific took delivery of the fuel and
ballast in the capacity of purchaser and
consumer and not in the capacity of common carrier.

[2] Subsection B imposes three requirements that Union Pacific must meet to
qualify for the exemption. Without examining the first two requirements, we conclude that Union Pacific did not qualify for
the interstate sales exemption under subsection B(3) because the fuel and ballast
vendors were not obligated to deliver Union Pacific's purchases outside Utah. Amoco's sales invoice for the purchase of fuel
specified that Amoco delivered the fuel
f.o.b. to Amoco's Salt Lake City operation.
The sales invoice for the purchase of ballast from MONROC indicated that title to
the ballast passed at MONROC's pit in
Utah. Moreover, the record did not contain
evidence of any contractual obligation of
Amoco, MONROC, RME, or UP Resources
to deliver Union Pacific's purchases across
the state boundary.3 In short, the evidence
supports the conclusion that physical delivery occurred in Utah when the vendors
loaded the fuel and ballast on Union Pacific's cars and that the vendors had no obligation to deliver the fuel or ballast out of
state. We therefore hold that the Commission made a rational and reasonable determination that Union Pacific did not qualify
for the interstate sales exemption under
subsection B.

Both Union Pacific and the Commission
offer plausible constructions of subsection
C of the interstate sales exemption rule.
Although our conclusion might be different
under a correction-of-error standard, we
conclude that the Commission made a reasonable and rational decision. Subsection
C seems to contemplate a common carrier
other than the buyer. The rule speaks of
delivery to "a common carrier for transportation to the buyer." If the common carrier is the buyer, there is no need for transportation to the buyer and the rule does not
apply. Furthermore, while courts should
generally construe taxing statutes favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against
the taxing authority, "the reverse is true of
exemptions." Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398
(Utah 1980). We therefore affirm the Commission's ruling on this question.

3.

Union Pacific points to internally generated
waybill documents that direct the route of
freight cars to substantiate its claim that rule
44S exempts the ballast and diesel fuel purchases transported for Union Pacific's use outside
Utah. Waybills, however, are not negotiated

II. TAXABILITY OF CROSS TIES
In order to meet its cross tie (railroad tie)
needs, Union Pacific purchased raw logs
from various places and shipped them to an
independent tie treating plant in Oregon.
The plant treated the ties with creosote,
drilled holes for spikes, and milled the ties
between the vendor and the purchaser and do
not obligate the vendor "by the express or unavoidable implied terms of the sale, or contract
to sell" to make physical delivery of the property across a state boundary. Utah Admin R. 86519-44S(B)(3).

to ensure uniform size. After the treating
plant completed this work, Union Pacific
transported the ties to Utah and installed
them there. Union Pacific then paid sales
and use tax on them based only on the cost
of the raw logs plus the cost of the creosote treatment. The Commission upheld a
deficiency order requiring Union Pacific to
include the cost of the drilling and milling
in the amount taxed on the cross ties. The
Commission concluded that "the cost[s] involved in creating the installed products,
such as milling costs, represent services
rendered in the repair or renovation of
tangible personal property and are taxable," relying on Utah Code Ann. § 59-12103(l)(g),4 and also concluded that "[i]t is
the addition of those costs into the total
cost of the cross ties that truly represents]
the taxable value of the ties." Union Pacific argues that the drilling and milling
services do not fit the categories of taxable
services contemplated by the statute. Union Pacific further contends that Utah's
imposition of a sales tax on services performed in another state unconstitutionally
interferes with interstate commerce.

Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587-89
(Utah 1991).

[41 We review Union Pacific's constitutional claims under section 63-46b-16(4)(a).
Subsection 4(a) provides that an appellate
court may grant relief if "the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional
on its face or as applied." We will apply a
no-deference correction-of-error standard to
review claims of unconstitutional agency
action under this section. Questar Pipeline Co, v. State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d
316, 317-18 (Utah 1991). Regarding the
statutory construction issue, to the extent
the legislature delegated to the Commission discretion to interpret the sales tax
statute, we will review the Commission's
construction under a reasonableness-andrationality standard; otherwise, we will apply a correction-of-error review to issues of
statutory construction. See Morton InVl,

A. Use Tax Based on Services
Performed Out of State
[5] Union Pacific claims that Utah oversteps the constitutional boundaries drawn
by the commerce clause by levying a sales
tax on services rendered in Oregon. In
order to analyze this claim, we must first
examine the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act
(the Act) and distinguish between the sales
tax component and the use tax component
of the Act. The Commission's rules differentiate the two:
A. The sales tax is imposed upon
sales of tangible personal property made
within the state of Utah, regardless of
where such property is intended to be
used, and on the amount paid or charged
for all services for repairs and renovations of tangible personal property or for
installation of tangible personal property
rendered in connection with other tangible personal property.
B. The use tax is imposed upon the
use, storage or other consumption of
tangible personal property, and upon the
amount paid or charged for the services
for repairs or renovations of tangible
personal property or installation of tangible personal property in connection with
other tangible personal property, if the
tangible personal property is for use,
storage, or consumption in Utah; and,
ordinarily, if the transaction does not
take place within the state of Utah.
C. The two taxes are compensating
taxes, one supplementing the other, but
both cannot be applicable to the same
transaction. The rate of tax is the same.
D. The distinguishing factor in determining which tax is applicable is normally the place where the sale or service
takes place. If the sale is made in Utah,
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made
elsewhere, the use tax applies.

4. Section 59-12-103(l)(g) states(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser
for the amount paid or charged for the following:

(g) services for repairs or renovations of
tangible personal property or services to install tangible personal property in connection
with other tangible personal property[.J
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Utah Admin.R. 865-19-1S. To recapitulate, the sales tax imposes a transaction tax
on certain sales and certain services that
occur in Utah. Complementing the sales
tax, the use tax imposes an excise tax on
tangible property and certain services performed in connection with that property,
where the property is stored or used in
Utah but is not subject to Utah sales tax
because it was purchased or the service
was performed outside of Utah. See Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 387
P.2d 998, 999 (Utah 1964).
If the owner of property used in Utah
paid sales or use tax in another state, that
tax is credited to offset the use tax levied
in Utah.5 Because of the use tax, items
used in Utah but purchased elsewhere
share the same tax burden as those items
purchased in Utah. The use tax, therefore,
helps Utah merchants compete on equal
terms with merchants in other states by
removing the incentive for purchasers to
search for states with lower sales tax in
which to purchase items for use in Utah.
See id.; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577, 581, 57 S.Ct. 524, 526, 81
L.Ed. 814 (1937) (Silas Mason); Paul J.
Hartman, Federal Limitations on State
and Local Taxation § 10:7 (1981).
Union Pacific claims that Utah violated
the commerce clause by levying a sales tax
on services rendered in Oregon. In so
claiming, Union Pacific misapprehends the
nature of the tax imposed and how it relates to the commerce clause. Utah levied
a use tax, not a sales tax. Utah did not
levy a tax on the sale of the raw logs and
the services performed out of state; instead, Utah taxed Union Pacific's use of
cross ties within the state.
For over fifty years, the United States
Supreme Court has upheld the nondiscriminatory application of a tax on the use of
property that has come to rest in a state.
See, e.g., Silas Mason; Wiloil Corp v.
Pennsylvania, 294 U S. 169, 55 S.Ct. 358,
79 L.Ed. 838 (1935). In Silas Mason, contractors working on Grand Coulee Dam on
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) exempts
from sales and use tax "property upon which a
sales or use tax was paid to some other state, or
one of its subdivisions, except that the state

the Columbia River objected to the state of
Washington's imposition of a use tax.
Washington taxed equipment the contractors used in Washington but had purchased
out of state. The Washington tax scheme
levied a "tax or excise for the privilege of
using within this state any article of tangible personal property," including the cost
of transportation from the place of purchase. 300 U.S. at 580. The tax scheme
also provided credit against the use tax for
sales or use tax paid in Washington or in
some other state.
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo
noted that items obtained through interstate commerce do not necessarily remain
in interstate commerce. Furthermore, he
recognized that because states can levy a
tax on property within the state, they can
levy a tax on the use or enjoyment of
property:
The tax is not upon the operations of
interstate commerce, but upon the privilege of use after commerce is at an end.
Things acquired or transported in interstate commerce may be subjected to a
property tax, non-discriminatory in its operation, when they have become part of
the common mass of property withm the
state of destination
. For like reasons
they may be subjected, when once they
are at rest, to a non-discriminatory tax
upon use or enjoyment.
Id. 300 U.S. at 582, 57 S Ct at 526.
[6-81 Hence, the commerce clause permits a state to tax property which has
"become part of the common mass of property within the state." Moreover, it does
not prohibit the state from including the
price of services performed in the manufacture of tangible property in calculating the
basis for the use tax levy This is implicit
in the nature of tangible personal property.
Both raw materials and the services performed in transforming those raw materials into a finished article contribute to the
value of an item of tangible property Consequently, when a state bases a use tax on
shall be paid any difference between the tax
paid and the tax imposed bv [the Act) and no
adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater
than the tax imposed by (the Act] "

the selling price of an item of tangible tion with tangible property in calculating
property, the basis necessarily includes the the basis for a use tax, it cannot impose a
cost of services because the seller incorpo- tax which discriminates against interstate
rates the cost of the services into the sell- commerce. The Halliburton Court stated
ing price. The Court in Silas Mason, for that "equal treatment for in-state and outexample, upheld the Washington tax, which of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the
based the use tax on the total retail price of condition precedent for a valid use tax on
the construction equipment, not merely on goods imported from out-of-state." Id. at
the price of the unassembled component 70, 83 S.Ct at 1204. The following facts
parts of the equipment. Id. at 579, 57 S.Ct. stipulated by the parties in Halliburton
at 525.
demonstrate the discriminatory impact of
[9] A state may also include the cost of the Louisiana tax:
services performed in connection with
If Halliburton had purchased its materitangible personal property that the taxpayals, operated its shops, and incurred its
er already owns in calculating the basis for
Labor and Shop Overhead expenses at a
the use tax. The basis of the Washington
location within the State of Louisiana,
tax approved in Silas Mason included the
there would have been a sales tax due to
service of transporting goods already
the State of Louisiana upon the cost of
owned by the taxpayer. Id. at 580, 57 S.Ct.
materials purchased in Louisiana and a
at 525. In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 313 U.S. 64, 83 S.Ct. 1201, Use Tax on materials purchased outside
of Louisiana; but there would have been
10 L.Ed.2d 202 (1963), the Court again conno Louisiana sales tax or use tax due
sidered a state use tax that included the
upon the Labor and Shop Overhead.
cost of services in the basis for calculating
the tax. Halliburton involved a use tax Id. at 67, 83 S.Ct. at 1202. In order for the
levied by the state of Louisiana that includ- state to include out-of-state services in the
ed the out-of-state costs of labor and shop basis for calculating the use tax, the Conoverhead incurred in the manufacture of stitution requires that those services be
specialized equipment. The taxpayer man- taxable if performed within the state.
ufactured oil well cementing trucks and
[12,13] If applied correctly, the Utah
electrical well logging trucks in Oklahoma,
some of which the taxpayer used in Louisi- Sales and Use Tax Act does not discrimiana. Id. at 66, 83 S.Ct. at 1202. In exam- nate against interstate commerce. The
ining the Louisiana use tax, the Hallibur- Commission's rules provide, 'The use tax is
ton Court did not object to inclusion of a complement to the sales tax and the rules
labor costs the taxpayer incurred in Okla- promulgated, when applicable, are common
homa in the basis for calculating the Loui- to both taxes." Utah Admin.R. 865-21-2U;
siana use tax.6 We therefore hold that see Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm %n,
including the costs of services performed in 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998, 999 (1964)
Oregon in the basis of the Utah use tax (sales and use tax acts are correlative and
imposed on Union Pacific's cross ties does complementary to each other). Moreover,
not in itself impose a burden on interstate courts should construe statutes so that
commerce.
they conform to constitutional mandates.
Therefore, in reviewing the construction
B. Discrimination Against
and application of the Act, this court will
Interstate Commerce
uphold the imposition of a use tax on tangi[10,11] Although the state may include ble property imported from out of state
the price of services performed in connec- only if the state could have taxed the in6. The Court, however, ultimately struck down
the Louisiana use tax An in state manufacturer
of the same item would not have been taxed on
the labor and overhead costs. Because the outof-state manufacturer faced a higher tax bur-

den, the Court held that the scheme discriminated against interstate commerce. Id. 373 U S
at 75, 83 S.Ct. at 1206. See the discussion in the
next section.
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volved transactions if they had occurred
within the state.7
C. Application of the Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act
Union Pacific purchased raw logs from
various vendors located outside Utah and
paid sales taxes on these purchases. After
acquiring title, the railroad shipped these
logs to an independent contractor in Oregon for creosote treatment and milling and
drilling services in preparation for their use
as cross ties. The railroad held title to the
ties at all times after the initial purchase of
the raw logs.8 Union Pacific paid use tax
based on the cost of the raw logs plus the
creosote treatment. However, Union Pacific did not include the cost of drilling and
milling services in calculating the basis of
the use tax.
The Act permits the state to tax "retail
sales of tangible personal property made
within the state," certain enumerated services rendered within the state, and in-state
storage, use, or consumption of tangible
property purchased outside the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. The basis
for the taxation of personal property and
certain services rendered in connection
therewith is calculated on the "amount paid
or charged" for the sale or service. Id.
The use tax, as discussed in section A
above, mirrors the sales tax in its application. Accordingly, the use tax should also
be based on the amount paid for the raw
logs and the amount paid for those services
that are taxable under the terms of the
statute. The only provisions that could
conceivably apply to the milling and drilling
services performed on the cross ties are the
following:
7.

Union Pacific also claims that Utah's use tax
discriminates against interstate commerce by
subjecting Union Pacific to double taxation.
We summarily dismiss this contention by pointing to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28), which
exempts from sales and use tax
property upon which a sales or use tax was
paid to some other state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any
difference between the tax paid and the taximposed by [the Act,] and no adjustment is
allowed if the tax paid was greater than the
tax imposed by [the Act).

(g) services for repairs or renovations
of tangible personal property or services
to install tangible personal property in
connection with other tangible personal
property;
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible
personal property.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103.
Union Pacific argues that drilling and
milling are not the same as washing, cleaning, repairing, or renovating. The Commission found that
the cost(s] involved in creating the installed products, such as milling costs,
represent services rendered in the repair
or renovation of tangible personal property and are taxable. It is the addition
of those costs to the total cost of the
cross ties that truly represents] the taxable value of the ties.
The notion of "taxable value" applied by
the Commission implies that the Commission included the amount paid for the services performed on the ties because those
services added to the value of the ties.
The "value" of the ties, however, is not the
proper basis for calculating use tax. The
basis for calculating use tax in the instant
case is the amount paid for the raw logs
when purchased plus the amount paid for
services that fall into one of the specified
categories of taxable services.
[14] The Commission has attempted to
classify the milling and drilling services as
repairs or renovations. Because we conclude that the Commission has discretion to
interpret the terms "repairs" and "renovations," we review the Commission action
for reasonableness and rationality. Utah
Administrative Rule 865-19-78S (rule 78S),
This exemption ensures that the state will not
subject out-of-state sales and ser\ices to double
taxation.
8. These facts distinguish the instant case from
our recent case of BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax
Commission, 183 Utah Adv Rep. 20 (March 31,
1992), in which we upheld imposition of sales
tax on the cost of services performed incidental
to and as part of the actual sale of tangible
personal property. Id. at 2A. The services at
issue in this case all occurred independently
from and well after the sale of the property
itself.
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guides the taxation of services pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103:
A. Persons who wash, clean, repair,
or renovate tangible personal property,
whether material is furnished by the seller or not, are required to collect the sales
tax upon the total charge made for the
rendition of such services.
B. Amounts paid or charged for installing tangible personal property in
connection with other tangible personal
property are subject to tax.
The Commission found that the categories
of taxable services contained in rule 78S
provide for the taxation of the creosote
treatment and the drilling and milling services. The creosote treatment involved applying tangible personal property, the creosote, to other tangible personal property,
the cross ties. The creosote treatment is
thus taxable.9 See BJ-Titan Servs. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822 (Utah
1992).
[15] Rule 78S, however, does not support taxing the drilling and milling services
on logs Union Pacific had previously purchased. Milling logs into uniform size and
drilling spike holes do not involve the installation of tangible personal property.
Furthermore, drilling and milling do not
suggest the same type of activity as washing or cleaning. The Commission appears
to view drilling and milling as equivalent to
repair or renovation. Repair and renovation, however, suggest activities that "fix"
9. Union Pacific does not dispute this. In fact,
as mentioned above. Union Pacific paid taxes on
these services.
10. Rule 865-19-5IS of the Utah Administrative
Code (rule 5IS) supports the conclusion that
services performed in the creation of a newly
manufactured product arc not the same as the
repair or renovation of an already manufactured product. Rule 5IS provides:
A. The amount charged for fabrication or
installation which is part of the process of
creating a finished article of tangible personal
property must be included in the amount
upon which tax is collected. Tftis type of
labor and service charge may not be deducted
from the selling price used for taxation purposes even though billed separately to the consumer and regardless of whether the articles
are commonly carried in stock or made up on
special order.

an already manufactured product. To repair is to "restore by replacing a part or
putting together what is torn or broken."
To renovate is to "restore to a former
better state." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 998 (1984). Drilling and
milling the cross ties did not involve repairing existing cross ties or restoring the existing cross ties to a former better state.10
Thus, even under a deferential standard of
review, we agree with Union Pacific that
the drilling and milling services are not
repairs or renovations within the meaning
of section 59-12-103(1 )(g). We note that
the witness for the Auditing Division admitted as much at the hearing before the
Tax Commission, and this admission went
uncontested.
The proper focus is not on what Union
Pacific "imported" into this state, i.e., finished railroad ties, but rather on the transactions that actually took place, whether
1
inside or outside Utah, and the taxability of
each transaction. The Commission erroneously adopted the former approach in concluding that the drilling and milling services were taxable because they contributed
to the "taxable value" of the ties. Union
Pacific separately purchased raw logs,
drilling and milling services, and creosoting
services. Union Pacific paid taxes on the
purchase of raw logs and the purchase of
creosoting services. But none of the provisions in the Sales and Use Tax Act permit
the taxation of the drilling and milling serB. Casting, forging, cutting, drilling, heat
treating, surfacing, machining, constructing,
and assembling are examples of steps in the
process resulting in the creation or production of a finished article.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 51S underscores that the cost of services
performed prior to the sale of an item of tangible personal property must be included in the
amount paid for the item for sales tax purposes.
The rule includes an extensive list that illustrates some of the types of services taxable in
the sale of a finished item of tangible personal
property. Services performed on items owned
by the taxpayer, however, may only be taxed
under rule 78S. Moreover, rule 78S's omission
of an extensive list similar to the list found in
rule 5IS indicates that authority to tax services
performed on items owned by the taxpayer is
not coextensive with the authority to tax based
on services performed prior to sale.
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rices when performed independently from
he sale of the ties themselves. We thereore hold that the Commission erred in
•equiring Union Pacific to pay use tax for
he amount paid for these services.
III.

TAXABILITY OF AAR
CAR REPAIRS
[16] Federal law requires Union Pacific
o inspect for safety defects all freight cars
eceived from other railroads that travel on
Jnion Pacific's lines. Pursuant to rules
promulgated by the American Association
•f Railroads (AAR), Union Pacific repairs
afety defects on freight cars and charges
he railroad owning the defective freight
ar for services and materials. According
o a formula created in an audit prior to
959, Union Pacific charged and collected
ales tax on only 9.82 percent of the total
epair bill for AAR repairs it performed in
Jtah.
The rationale behind the formula is that
ince Union Pacific had already paid sales
r use tax on the repair materials stored in
& warehouse, the taxing authority needed
0 adjust the amount of tax charged for
epairs using those materials. The Auditig Division has audited Union Pacific sevral times since 1959 and has not instructed
Jnion Pacific to discontinue the practice of
ollecting sales tax on only a fraction of
he total AAR repair bill. In this most
ecent audit, however, the Auditing Diviion issued a sales tax deficiency assesslent against Union Pacific, claiming that
Inion Pacific's use of the 9.82 percent forlula was incorrect and that Union Pacific
wed sales tax on the entire amount of the
LAR repairs.
On review, the Commission agreed with
he Auditing Division that the 9.82 percent
ormula was incorrect and that Union Paific should have collected sales tax on the
ull amount of AAR repairs. The Commision, however, overturned the tax deficieny assessed by the Auditing Division. Beause the use of the formula was a longtanding practice left uncorrected by sever1 audits, the Commission reasoned that
mposing taxes for prior periods would contitute retroactive law making. Therefore,

without assessing a deficiency, the Commission ordered Union Pacific to collect tax
on the total bill for AAR repairs beginning
five days after the date of the Commission's decision. Union Pacific seeks relief
from the prospective compliance required
by the Commission's decision.
We decline to address this aspect of the
Commission's order because the Commission has not yet audited or assessed a tax
deficiency against Union Pacific in this
matter, but has determined only that one
hundred percent of the charge for the AAR
repairs will be taxable in the future. Union Pacific does not appear to contest the
abstract proposition that services and materials furnished in AAR repairs are taxable,
but contends instead that it is entitled to
"credits or deductions" against this tax liability to reflect taxes it has previously paid
on materials for repairs. The Tax Commission, however, should determine in the first
instance whether Union Pacific can validly
claim to have satisfied a specific portion of
its sales tax liability for AAR repair
charges or in the alternative whether Union Pacific's initial purchases of inventory
for use in repairs should be tax exempt.
The parties themselves have not squarely
confronted this issue in the proceedings
below or in their briefs, and the practical
effect of the Commission's order is not yet
clear. Union Pacific's implicit suggestion
that the Commission's order creates an
abuse of the state's power to tax is purely
hypothetical. Accordingly, we conclude
that it would be inappropriate for us to
treat this issue at this time.
IV.

PENALTY ASSESSMENT

The Auditing Division imposed a penalty
on the deficiency assessment. Union Pacific did not contest the penalty before the
Commission but does so before this court.
The Commission may assess a penalty for
negligent, intentional, or fraudulent underpayment of tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1401(3). In applying the penalty, the Auditing Division and the Commission should not
mechanically assess a penalty in every case
of underpayment. Instead, they should determine in each case whether the taxpayer

negligently, intentionally, or fraudulently
underpaid. Because Union Pacific did not
raise the issue before the Commission, we
have no basis in the record upon which to
review the imposition of the penalty. It
does not appear, however, that either the
Auditing Division or the Commission has
made the finding of negligence, intentional
disregard, or fraud necessary to justify a
penalty under section 59-1-401(3). Because we are remanding this matter for
other proceedings, we vacate the imposition
of the penalty and remand this issue for
reconsideration by the Commission and specific findings and conclusions regarding a
penalty.
V.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the Commission's decision to
assess sales tax on Union Pacific's purchases of fuel and ballast transported for Union
Pacific's use outside Utah. We reverse the
Commission's decision to assess use tax on
the drilling and milling costs paid by Union
Pacific. We decline to address the Commission's conclusion that Union Pacific will
henceforth be required to collect sales tax
on the full amount of repairs made on
other railroads' freight cars under AAR
regulations. Finally, we vacate the Commission's decision to impose a penalty on
the tax deficiency and remand the issue for
a determination of whether Union Pacific's
underpayment was negligent, intentional,
or fraudulent.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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HALES SAND & GRAVEL,
INC., Petitioner,

AUDIT DIVISION OF the STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH, Respondent.
No. 910008.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 12, 1992.

Sand and gravel seller sought review
of tax deficiency and negligence penalty
assessed by Tax Commission. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1)
charges for delivering sand and gravel to
customers were subject to sales tax, but (2)
failure to pay sales tax was not negligent.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

1. Statutes <s=>205
In construing statute, court views it as
a comprehensive whole rather than unrelated collection of provisions.
2. Taxation <2=>204(1)

Although taxing statutes are generally
construed in favor of taxpayer, tax exemptions are strictly construed against taxpayer.
3. Taxation <S=1267
Sales tax exemption for intrastate
freight charges applied only to common
carriers; accordingly, since sand and gravel seller was not "common carrier," delivery charges imposed by sand and gravel
seller before title to sand and gravel passed
were subject to sales tax. U.C.A.1953, 5912-104(18).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and

definitions.
4. Taxation <S=>I282
Passage of title is moment upon which
sales transaction is to be valued for purposes of computing sales tax. U.C.A.1953,
59-12-103(l)(a).
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[10th Cir.1986); Rccg v. Shaughncssy, 570
F.2d 309, 317 (10th Cir.1978).
J & M claims that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in excluding the
deposition since appellants made no showing that Mr. Brown was unavailable or
even unwilling to testify. In fact, J & M
claims that there was no representation
made that appellants even requested Mr.
Brown to testify and that the use of his
deposition was merely trial strategy to
avoid revealing his demeanor to the fact
finder.
We have carefully scrutinized the transcript of the court's ruling and agree that
no representation was made as to whether
appellants had attempted to procure Mr.
Brown's appearance. However, we conclude that appellants made a sufficient
showing under rule 32(a) to have the deposition admitted and that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to admit it.
[2] The element of discretion provided
by the rule is a narrow one—exceptions to
the preference for oral testimony apply
"absent some compelling reason otherwise." Nash v. Heckler, 108 F.R.D. 376,
378 (W.D.N.Y.1985).2 The federal cases in
which the issue has been considered have
held that "the mere absence of the deponent from the 100 mile area is sufficient,
and the party attempting to submit the
deposition into evidence need not proffer
an excuse for the failure of the deponent to
appear in court." Houser v. Snap-on
Tools Corp., 202 F.Supp. 181, 189 (D.Md.
1962); see also Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d
591, 696 (7th Cir.1965); Klepal v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir.1956).
The reasoning behind the rule is simply
that "it would be too burdensome to require a deponent beyond the distance of
100 miles to appear at trial." United
States v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y.1981).
The rule applies equally to plaintiffs and
defendants, see Richmond v. Brooks, 227
F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir.1955), parties and
non-parties. See 4A J. Moore & J.D. Lu2. Where there is no Utah case directly on point,
we turn to the federal courts that have examined the comparable federal rule. See Heritage
Bank A Trust v. London, 770 P.2d 1009. 1010 n.
2 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("As our rules of civil

cas, Moore s Federal Practice § 32.05 (2d
ed. 1989). The distance is measured "as
the crow flies" from the deponent's residence to the courthouse. SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D.Conn.
1977).
The trial court apparency considered
rule 32(aX3)(B)'s exception, "unless it appears that the absence of the witness was
procured by the party offering the deposition," adjudged Mr. Brown to be a party,
and concluded that by not being present, he
had procured his own absence. Although
Mr. Brown was not a named party, even a
"substantial identity of interest" between
the party offering the deposition and the
deponent does not, without more, raise a
"spectre of illicit procurement." Nash, 108
F.R.D. at 378; Carey v. Bahama Cruise
Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir.1988).
"Procurement" implies that there was
some collusion in having witnesses remove
themselves from the reach of subpoenas or
to deliberately absent themselves from the
jurisdiction. Weiss v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D.
387, 389 (D.Md.1950). Moreover, "procuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate
presence are quite different things."
Snap-on Tools, 202 F.Supp. at 189.
The proponent of admission has the burden to show that the requirements of the
ru/e have been met. See Parlato v. Interport Trucking Co., 540 F.Supp. 1051,
1052-53 (E.D.N.Y.1982). Appellants carried this burden by presenting evidence
that the deponent lived more than 100 miles
from the courthouse. That evidence was
never controverted. Nor is there anything
in the record to suggest that Mr. Brown
had procured his own absence. In fact,
there is testimony that he moved to Montana "a little over two years" before trial.
See, e.g., Bellamy v. Molitor, 108 F.R.D. 1,
2 (W.D.Ky.1983) (party deponent had always lived more than 100 miles from courthouse); see also Starr v. J. Hacker Co.,
688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.1982). Appellants
also specifically represented to the court
that none of the named parties had proprocedure are fashioned after the federal rules,
wc may properly look to authorities under the
federal rules."); see also Pate v. Marathon Steel
Co., 692 P.2d 765. 767 n. 1 (Utah 1984).
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cured the deponent's absence. It was presumably advantageous for appellants to offer live testimony as opposed to deposition
evidence, see Weiss, 10 F.R.D. at 388,
which fact "is likely to limit frequent resort
to this course." Richmond, 227 F.2d at
492.
Although the rules of evidence may offer
an alternative means of admitting depositions,2 we need not address that alternative
since we conclude that appellants made a
sufficient showing to admit the deposition
under Utah R.Civ.P. 32(a). It was established, without dispute, that Mr. Brown
was a resident of Montana at the time of
trial, and had been so for a considerable
time. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the deposition.
We further conclude that the error in
excluding the deposition is substantial and
prejudicial. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. The
proffer made by appellants adequately indicates the materiality of the deposition evidence to their case. Mr. Brown was president of B & E and had the responsibility to
negotiate contracts and to bid the work.
Even the trial court believed Mr. Brown to
be a "key witness" and the evidence to be
"quite material." Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment against appellants, and remand the case for retrial or for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In light of this disposition, we need not
address other issues raised on appeal.
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ.,
concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Charles WEBB and John E. Humphrey.
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 890256-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 26, 1990.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) defendant
had not received ineffective assistance of
counsel on basis of conflict of interest,
although codefendants were represented
by two public defenders from same office;
(2) defendant lacked standing to contest
constitutionality of search of his housemate's purse; (3) substantial evidence existed upon which jury could reasonably find
that defendant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided
codefendant in aggravated robbery of jewelry store with requisite intent; and (4)
defendant's sentence for armed robbery
conviction was properly enhanced under
use of firearm statute, even though offense
had already been enhanced to aggravated
robbery due to use of deadly weapon in
crime.
Conviction affirmed; remanded for
corrected sentence.
1. Criminal Law <e=>1028
In absence of exceptional circumstances or plain error, appellate court normally

3.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a) and the federal rules of
evidence are cumulative, such that a deposition
not falling within the provisions of rule 32(a)
may still be admissible under the standards of
Fed.R.Evid. 804. See 4 A Moore's Federal Practice § 32.02111. 32.05 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(a));
International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at
384.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are comparable to the federal rules. See Utah R.Civ.P.
43(a) ("In all trials, the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules for) the Utah Rules

of Evidence
"); see also Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at
117. Moreover. Utah R.Civ.P. 32(a) provides
that "[a] deposition previously taken may also
be used as permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence." Thus, a deposition may be admitted if
the deponent is unavailable as a witness. Utah
R.Evid. 804(b). "Unavailability" is defined in
several ways, and includes situations where the
deponent "is absent from the hearing and the
proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means." Utah R.Evid. 804(a)(5).

STATE v. WEBB
will not consider issues, even constitutional
ones, that have not been presented first to
trial court for its consideration and resolution.
2. Criminal Law <$=*\ 130(5)
Court of Appeals would not consider
whether right to counsel guaranteed in
State Constitution should be interpreted
more expansively than federal provision,
where defendant's appellate counsel simply
asserted that different result should flow
from state constitutional guarantee without adequately briefing or arguing for different analyses under the State and Federal Constitutions. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6;
Const Art. 1, § 12.

two public defenders from same office, or
to appoint different attorney for one defendant, where one defendant was represented
by privately retained attorney at time of
motion, and ruling on motion was never
requested or obtained. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 6.

8. Criminal Law <s=»641.5(6, 7)
Codefendant's motions captioned "Motions for Conflict of Interest" did not provide sufficient notice to trial court of potential conflict arising from representation of
codefendants by two public defenders from
same office, and thus did not impose affirmative duty on trial judge to act sua
sponte and appoint different attorney for
3. Criminal Law <s=*641.5
one defendant or inquire into propriety of
Sixth Amendment right to effective as- representation, where "conflict of interest"
sistance of counsel includes right to coun- referred to by motions appeared to be codesel free from conflicts of interest. U.S. fendant's disagreement with counsel over
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
handling of pretrial identification issue,
which had already been argued to, but re4. Criminal Law «=>1035(7)
Defendant who raises no objection at jected by, trial court. U.S.C.A. Const.
trial to multiple representation must show Amend. 6.
that actual conflict of interest existed
which adversely affected his lawyer's per- 9. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(7)
formance to prevail on claim of ineffective
Trial judge, by virtue of abandoned
assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. Const pretrial severance motion, does not know
Amend. 6.
or reasonably should know before or at
trial
of conflict of interest on part of attor5. Criminal Law <£»641.5(4)
neys, representing codefendants, and thus
Defendant who shows that he objected severance motion does not impose affirmaat trial to multiple representation need not tive duty on trial judge to act sua sponte to
demonstrate prejudice from conflict of in- inquire into propriety of representation of
terest to establish ineffectiveness of coun- codefendants. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
sel claim. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
10. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(7)
6. Criminal Law <s=641.5(6, 7)
Defendant's postconviction motion for
Mere fact that codefendants were repnew
trial could not constitute timely "objecresented by two attorneys from same public defender office was alone insufficient to tion at trial" to alleged conflict of interest
impose affirmative duty on trial judge to on part of counsel, and thus trial judge
act sua sponte and appoint one defendant could not be faulted for failing to act sua
an attorney from different office or to in- sponte and inquire into propriety of reprequire into propriety of representation. sentation of codefendants by two public
defenders from same office. U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
ConstAmend. 6.
7. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(6, 7)
See publication Words and Phrases
Defendant's pretrial motion to sever
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
his trial from that of codefendant did not
impose affirmative duty on trial judge to 11. Criminal Law <S=*1035(7)
later act sua sponte to inquire into proprieDefendant could succeed on his Sixth
ty of representation of codefendants by
Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel
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claim only if he demonstrated both that
counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that actual conflict of interest
adversely affected counsel's performance,
where alleged conflict was not adequately
raised in trial court until after conviction.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

sire or effort to bolster codefendant's d
fense at expense of defendant. U.S.C.,
ConstAmend. 6.
16. Criminal Law <e=>1044.1(2)
Court of Appeals would not consid*
defendant's allegation that police had n
satisfied statutory prior demand requir
ments prior to entering residence to mal
arrest, where issue was raised for fir
time on appeal, record did not show th
statutory noncompliance ground was u
known or unavailable to defendant befoi
or at trial, defendant did not contend th;
plain error exception should apply, and d
fendant did not contend that any speci
circumstances justified his failure I
present such ground for motion to su]
press to trial court U.C.A.1953, 77-7-H
77-7-8.

12. Criminal Law <fc»641.5
To show that actual conflict of interest
existed on part of defense counsel, defendant must point to specific instances in
record to suggest actual conflict or impairment of defendant's interest. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
13. Criminal Law <s=641.5
Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is not violated where conflict of interest on part of defense counsel
is irrelevant or merely hypothetical; there
must be actual, significant conflict U.S.
17. Searches and Seizures <S=D69
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
Evidence showed that shotgun was 1<
14. Criminal Law <s=641.5(6)
cated by officers in plain view while off
Defense counsel's pursuit of united de- cers were lawfully present in bedroom t
fense with codefendant at joint trial did not arrest defendant, and thus shotgun wa
show actual conflict of interest which not subject to suppression, even thoug
would warrant finding that defendant re- shotgun may have been seized when polic
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel reentered bedroom after arrest. U.S.CJ
arising from representation of codefend- ConstAmend. 4.
ants by two public defenders from same
office, although there was no eyewitness 18. Criminal Law <S=>394.5(2)
Proponent of motion to suppress ha
victim testimony identifying defendant as
robber, where other witnesses testified to burden of establishing that his own Fourt
defendant's direct involvement before and Amendment rights were violated by cha
immediately after crime, and codefendants lenged search or seizure, as Fourth Amenc
took stand and gave entirely consistent, ment rights are personal rights which ma
corroborative testimony to support their not be vicariously asserted. U.S.C.-A
claim that others were the real culprits ConstAmend. 4.
while they were only "patsies." U.S.C.A.
19. Searches and Seizures <s=>161
ConstAmend. 6.
Person who is aggrieved by illega
15. Criminal Law <3=>641.5<6)
search and seizure only through introduc
Defendant failed to demonstrate that tion of damaging evidence secured ty
any actual conflict of interest arising from search of third person's premises or proper
representation of codefendants by two pub- ty has not had any of his Fourth Amend
lic defenders from same office resulted in ment rights infringed. U.S.C.A. Const
any adverse effect on his counsel's per- Amend. 4.
formance, even though counsel chose to
pursue united defense strategy; defendant 20. Searches and Seizures <s=»162
apparently supported enthusiastically the
Factors relevant to determining wheth
united defense strategy until it produced er defendant had legitimate expectation ol
unfavorable verdict, and there was no evi- privacy in area searched include: whether
dence that strategy was prompted by de- defendant had any possessory or proprie
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tary interest in place searched or items
seized in challenged search; whether defendant was legitimately on premises;
whether defendant had right to exclude
others from that place; whether defendant
exhibited subjective expectation that place
would remain free from governmental invasion; or whether defendant took normal
precautions to maintain his privacy. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
21. Searches and Seizures <&=>162
Defendant's ownership or possession
of items seized in allegedly unlawful search
is not determinative of whether defendant's
Fourth Amendment privacy rights in place
searched have been infringed. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
22. Searches and Seizures <s=162
Defendant who establishes privacy interest in place searched sufficient to contest legality of that search, in order to
suppress evidence seized as product of it, is
not deprived of Fourth Amendment standing to assert that claim merely because
another person actually owns either evidentiary items actually seized or personal effect in which seized items were found.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
23. Searches and Seizures <s=3164
Defendant had standing to contest legality of search of apartment rented by his
housemate, where defendant testified that
he actually resided in apartment with his
housemate and their child in "common law
marriage," ai.d that he contributed to
household expenses, including rent. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
24. Searches and Seizures <s=*180
Warrantless search conducted pursuant to consent that is voluntary in fact does
not violate Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
25. Searches and Seizures ^ ^
State has burden to prove that consent
given to search was voluntary. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
26. Searches and Seizures <s=>201
Voluntariness of consent to search is
question of fact to be determined from

totality of all circumstances.
ConstAmend. 4.

U.S.C.A.

27. Criminal Law ®=>1158(2)
Court of Appeals deferentially reviews
a trial court's finding of voluntary consent
to search, and will disturb it only if defendant demonstrates that there has been
clear error. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
28. Searches and Seizures <s=>184
Fact that apartment occupant was under arrest when she gave consent to search
did not preclude finding that consent to
search premises was voluntary. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
29. Searches and Seizures <s=5184
State carried its burden of proving that
apartment occupant's consent to search
was voluntary, even though occupant was
under arrest, where there was no evidence
that officers continued to brandish their
weapons once suspects were arrested, occupant's infant son was placed near her to
alleviate her fears for him, occupant was
allowed to get up from floor six or seven
minutes after arrest, occupant was allowed
to drink coffee and use bathroom, and occupant signed straightforward consent-tosearch form. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
30. Searches and Seizures <£=»164
Defendant lacked standing to contest
constitutionality of search of purse, even
though purse belonged to person with
whom he had intimate relationship, and
purse and its contents were in his home
when challenged search occurred, where
there was no evidence that defendant
owned purse, had ever sought or been given access to purse, or had ever put any of
his own effects in it. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
31. Searches and Seizures <s=>162
Defendant's privacy interest in common residence does not necessarily extend
to privacy interest in every object located
inside that residence.
U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.
32. Robbery <S>24.1(4)
Substantial evidence existed upon
which jury could reasonably find that defendant solicited, requested, commanded,

encouraged, or intentionally aided codefendant in aggravated robbery of jewelry
store with requisite intent, although there
was conflicting evidence presented in support of defense theory that codefendants
were innocent victims of setup by others,
and defendant had receipt issued in another
state by gas station at which another alleged coperpetrator's son worked. U.C.A.
1953, 76-2-202, 76-6-302(1).
33. Criminal Law <S=>1208.6(4)
Defendant's sentence for armed robbery conviction was properly enhanced under use of firearm statute, even though
offense had already been enhanced to aggravated robbery due to use of deadly
weapon during offense. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3203(1), 76-6-302(1 )(a), (2).
Samuel Alba (argued), Sally B. McMinimee, Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan Larsen (argued), A s s t Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent
Before BENCH, JACKSON and
BULLOCK » JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Charles Webb challenges his
jury conviction of aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). He raises
the following substantial issues: denial of
effective assistance of counsel; illegal
search of his apartment and of his mate's
purse; and insufficiency of the evidence.
He also challenges the sentence imposed.
We affirm the conviction, but remand the
case with instructions to correct the sentence.
FACTS
In January 1987, Britt Martindale met
defendant Webb and his girlfriend, Carolyn
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah

Gregersen, while in the hospital. Throup
them, Britt met John Humphrey, wr
stayed at her home for several days
mid-October 1987. At that time, Britt live
several blocks away from the apartmei
shared by Webb, Gregersen, her ten-ye*
old son, and their infant son.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on Octob<
21, 1987, a bearded man held the owner (
a Salt Lake City jewelry store and a secut
ty guard at gunpoint while he robbed th
store of cash, jewelry, and diamonds wort
approximately $40,000.
The man ha
pulled a sawed-off shotgun from a clot
bag and directed the owner to put th
contents of his safe and his display case
into the bag. Before leaving, the robbe
advised the two men not to try to follo\
him because he had "another guy" with
gun waiting outside. At trial, the stor
owner and the security guard identifie
Webb's codefendant, John Humphrey, a
the robber.
According to the testimony of Britt Mai
tindale, Webb drove up to her Midvate
Utah, home in a Cadillac at approximate^
4:00 p.m. on October 21, 1987, with Greger
sen in the passenger seat. Webb backe<
the car into Martindale's driveway, cam<
into her home, and spoke to her briefly
He took the blanket off her bed and direct
ed her to follow him outside to the car
where he handed her one side of the blan
ket and instructed her to hold it up. Webt
told Gregersen to push the trunk release
button inside the car. The trunk lid openec
and inside Martindale saw Humphrey
whom she had seen many times, including
a day or two before October 21, 1987
Everyone went inside her apartment,
where Humphrey went into the bathroom
and immediately began shaving off his
beard. Webb went back outside and returned shortly with a canvas bag and a
sawed-off shotgun with black tape around
the handle, which he handed to Britt She
put the shotgun, which she later identified
as the shotgun seized from Webb's bedroom and put into evidence, on a shelf in
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).
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icr pantry, while Webb and Gregersen sat
t her kitchen table and went through mon
y, rings, and other jewelry, including loose
lamonds, an opal, and a diamond watch,
hat they removed from the canvas bag
Vebb asked Humphrey's permission to
lve the diamond watch to Gregersen, and
hen did so Bntt later identified the dia
lond watch taken from Gregersen's purse
s the watch she saw Webb take from the
anvas bag and give to Gregersen Mean
rhile, Humphrey walked back and forth
etween the bathroom and the kitchen
rhile shaving, explaining how "he put the
hotgun in some guy's face" and hand
uffed a guard who had walked in on them
febb said everything "went great" and
lat it was a "little while before the cops
bowed up " He placed the jewels in a
aper bag and put the canvas bag in a
itchen cupboard, telling Bntt not to "mess
ith it" until he came back for it
After approximately forty five minutes,
ntt's husband, Russell Martindale, ar
ved Ten minutes later, Webb, Hum
^rey, and Gregersen left the Martindale
3artment with the paper bag In a phone
mversation with Bntt shortly thereafter,
r
ebb asked if she had seen "it" on the
>ws Webb returned to the Martindale
)me a few hours later and left again with
ie canvas bag, saying he was going to put
in the river Webb and Humphrey re
rned again at approximately 1130 pm
fter Bntt gave Webb the shotgun, Webb
id Humphrey left for Las Vegas along
ith Russell Martindale
On November 2, 1987, the police learned
at Bntt might know something about the
bbery The police interviewed her on
wember 3 Based on the information
e provided, the police obtained an arrest
irrant for Webb, Gregersen, and Hum
rey, who was staying at the Webb/Gre
rsen home that night The warrant was
ecuted by ten officers on the morning of
>vember 4, 1987, at the apartment of
ebb and Gregersen Gregersen was ar
sted and handcuffed in the living room of
e apartment Her purse was searched
r weapons incident to that arrest, and the
imond watch ultimately introduced by
B State at tnal was observed, however, it
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was not seized until later at police head
quarters While Gregersen's arrest was
going on in the living room area, Webb and
Humphrey were arrested in separate bed
rooms and then brought to the living room
area The police seized a shotgun from the
bedroom in which Webb had been found
A short time later, Gregersen signed a
consent to search form During the ensu
ing search of the apartment, conducted af
ter the trio had been taken away, the police
seized miscellaneous paperwork, some
clothing, and jewelry, including a ring from
Gregersen's jewelry box The diamond
watch and the ring were both identified by
the store owner as items stolen from him
on October 21, 1987
At their preliminary heanngs in late No
vember 1987, Webb and Humphrey were
represented by two attorneys from the Salt
Lake Legal Defenders
Association
Webb's appointed counsel withdrew from
representing Webb two weeks later at his
arraignment and Webb privately retained
attorney Ray Stoddard to represent him
and Gregersen Humphrey continued to be
represented by appointed counsel from the
Legal Defender Association, Lisa Remal
In early January 1988, Remal filed a mo
tion to sever Humphrey's trial from Gre
gersen s a motion in which Stoddard joined
on behalf of Webb Also in Januarv 1988
on behalf of Webb and Gregersen, Stod
dard filed a motion to suppress the use of
the shotgun, ring, and diamond watch as
evidence After an evidentiary hearing
the motion to sever Gregersen's trial from
that of Webb and Humphrey was granted
and the suppression motion was denied
In earlv March 1988, Stoddard filed a
motion to withdraw as Webb s counsel
partlv based on unspecified "differences"
between Webb and Stoddard about how
Webb's defense should be conducted A
few days later Stoddard filed a motion to
se\ er Webb s trial from Humphrey s on the
ground that substantially more evidence
would be adduced against Humphrey and
defendant Webb would be prejudiced by
the jury s inclination to find him guilty bv
association The motion to withdraw as
Webb's counsel was subsequently granted

and another attorney at the Salt Lake Le
gal Defenders Association, Brooke Wells,
was appointed to represent Webb, while
Stoddard continued to represent Greger
sen Webb's severance motion was not
pursued by his new counsel After Webb's
supplemental motion to suppress evidence
seized from the apartment was denied and
discovery was conducted, the codefendants
proceeded to a joint trial m early June
1988
At trial, Bntt testified to the events at
her house on October 21, 1987, recited
above Russell Martindale admitted he had
stolen a car at Webb's request that was
used in the jewelry store robbery He had
turned this car over to Webb in Salt Lake
City on October 20, 1987 He stated that
Webb had promised to pay his rent in ex
change for the stolen car, and he denied
knowing what was to be done with it A
coat and hat found in that car matched the
eyewitnesses' description of the clothing
worn by the robber Russell also testified
that, the night of October 21, Webb told
him he knew someone in Las Vegas who
could get rid of the stuff Webb and Hum
phrey had stolen Russell was granted
immunity from prosecution for car theft in
exchange for trial testimony concerning
the robbery
Webb and Humphrey both testified and
presented a united defense, claiming that
they had been set up by the Martindales
Webb stated that he had purchased the
nng and watch from Bntt on November 2,
1987, and had then given the nng to Gre
gersen for her birthday He claimed to
have been m Ely, Nevada, pursuing his
occupation as a seller of gold, silver, and
2

On appeal Webb contends for the first time
that the right to counsel guaranteed in Article I
section 12 of the Utah Constitution should be
interpreted more expansively than the federal
provision with the result that the state constitu
tion would impose an affirmative duty on state
trial judges to inquire into potential conflicts of
interest any time codefendants are represented
by members of the same law firm or public
defender office As explained at greater length
in the portion of this opinion dealing with the
fourth amendment claims in the absence of
exceptional circumstances or plain error, an
appellate court normally will not consider is
sues even constitutional ones that have not
been presented first to the trial court for its

diamonds when the robbery occurred, and
he introduced a gas station receipt from
there dated October 21, 1987, the day of
the robbery He admitted that he had
pawned some diamonds in Las Vegas on
October 22, 1987 Humphrey testified that
he was staying at the Martindale apart
ment on October 21 and that Bntt and
Russell left the apartment about 3 00 p m
that day and returned at 4 00 p m with a
bearded man known to him only as Frank
Frank carried a large bundle wrapped in a
quilt into the back bedroom Humphrey
said he never saw any weapon or jewelry
After "cleaning up" by shaving his own
beard off, Humphrey left with Frank and
Russell about 5 00 p m to go to Las Vegas,
where they met up with Webb, and Frank
left them Humphrey stated he had seen
Webb buy the diamond watch and a ring
from Bntt at her home on November 2
After the jury found Webb and Hum
phrey guilty of aggravated robbery, Webb
filed a motion for new trial claiming that
his tnal attorney, Wells, had inadequately
represented him because of a conflict of
interest created by her desire to not make
her colleague at the Salt Lake Legal De
fenders Association, Humphrey's counsel,
"look bad" The trial court denied this
motion, and Webb's appeal was pursued by
newly appointed private counsel
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
[1,2] Webb first claims he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel guaran
teed by the sixth amendment because his
trial attorney jointly represented his and
Humphrey's conflicting interests 2 This
consideration and resolution
See State \
Anderson 129 Utah Adv Rep 15 16 (1990)
State v Johnson 771 P2d 326 327-28 (Utah
Ct App 1989) Even if that principle of appellate
review were not a bar, we would still not re
solve the state constitutional claim raised here
Webbs appellate counsel simply asserts that a
different result should flow from the Utah con
stitutional guarantee without adequately brief
ing or arguing for different analyses under the
state and federal constitutions We need not
address the important question of the parame
ters of the Utah constitutional guarantee under
such circumstances Bg, State v Wareham
772 P 2d 960 966 (Utah 1989) (refusing to ad
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claim is based on the multiple representation of the two codefendants at their joint
trial by two attorneys from the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association.3
[3] The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right
to counsel free from conflicts of interest.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Ordinarily, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be analyzed under the two-pronged test set forth in
Strickland. Under that standard, a criminal defendant must show both that his
counsel's performance was deficient and
that it prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687,
104 S.Ct at 2064; State v. Carter, lie P.2d
886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Grueber, 776
P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied,
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). However, a sixth
amendment claim grounded on conflict of
interest is a special subtype of ineffectiveness claim, which must be examined under
a somewhat different standard that was
first enunciated in pre-Strickland cases.
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), one
attorney was appointed to represent three
codefendants. Before trial, the attorney
objected to his continued representation of
all three and requested the appointment of
separate counsel because of the possibility
for conflict arising from his receipt of confidential information from the codefendants. The pretrial motion for separate
counsel was denied before trial and a renewed motion was again denied just before
the jury was empanelled. Id. at 484, 98
S.Ct at 1179. Because these efforts
"brought home to the court" the possibility
dress appellant's claim of unconstitutionality in
the absence of legal analysis and supporting
authority); State v. fuifferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247
n. 5 (Utah 1988) (appellate court will not engage
in constructing arguments "out of whole cloth"
on behalf of defendants).
3. In Burger v. Kemp% 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct.
3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court considered a defendant's claim
that the joint representation of himself and a
coindictec at separate murder trials by two law
partners denied him effective assistance of
counsel because they had represented actually
conflicting interests to his detriment. Although
the Court noted that there was "much sub-

of inconsistent interests among the codefendants, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction because of the trial
court's failure to appoint separate counsel
or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was too remote to
warrant separate counsel. Id. The trial
court's failure to investigate a potential
conflict of interest based on multiple representation brought to its attention in a timely manner was presumed to be prejudicial,
requiring reversal because it unconstitutionally endangered the right to counsel.
Id. at 483-87, 98 S.Ct. at 1178-80.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently clarified that, although Holloway
required trial judges to investigate any
timely objections to multiple representation, the sixth amendment does not require
state court judges to initiate sua sponte
inquiries into the propriety of an attorney's
representation of codefendants in every
case:
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representation
and to advise the court promptly when a
conflict of interest arises during the
course of trial. Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation
entails no conflict or that the lawyer and
his clients knowingly accept such risk of
conflict as may exist. Indeed, as the
Court noted in Holloway, supra, at 485486, 98 S.Ct. at 1179, trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the
good faith and good judgment of defense
counsel. "An 'attorney representing two
defendants in a criminal matter is in the
stance" to the argument that such an arrangement creates a possible conflict of interest, id.,
107 S.Ct. at 3120, it specifically assumed, without deciding, that two law partners are considered one attorney for purposes of sixth
amendment analysis. Id. In his appeal and
before the trial court, Webb has assumed that
two attorneys from the same defender office
constitute a single attorney for purposes of sixth
amendment analysis, and the State has not contested the matter. We, therefore, proceed with
our analysis of the ineffectiveness claim on the
same basis, without considering or deciding this
threshold question.

best position professionally and ethically
to determine when a conflict of interest
exists or will probably develop in the
course of trial.'" 435 U.S. at 485, 98
S.Ct. at 1179, quoting State v. Davis, 110
Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973).
Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an
inquiry.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47,
100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717-18, 64 L.Ed.2d 333
(1980) (footnotes omitted); accord United
States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790-93
(10th Cir.1985) (sixth amendment does not
require trial judge to initiate inquiry into
potential conflict of interest when no party
either objects to multiple representation or
raises a conflict issue).
[4,5] Noting that a possible conflict of
interest inheres in almost every instance of
multiple representation, the Cuyler court
explained that the Holloway presumption
of prejudice from a possible conflict of
interest is only appropriate in cases where
the trial court did not provide an objecting
defendant with an "opportunity to show
that potential conflicts impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial." Cuyler, 446
U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. The Court
reaffirmed that multiple representation
does not violate the sixth amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest,
holding that the possibility that multiple
representation involved a conflict of interests is insufficient to impugn a criminal
conviction. Id. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719;
see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107
S.Ct 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (permitting joint representation of codefendants is not per se violation of sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel); Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476,
481 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 870,
108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987).
Therefore, a defendant who raises no objection at trial to multiple representation must
show that an actual conflict of interest
existed which adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at
348,100 S.Ct. at 1718; Thomas, 818 F.2d at
480; Fitzpatrick v. McCormack, 869 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir.1989). A defendant who

makes such a showing need not demon
strate prejudice to establish an ineffective
ness of counsel claim. Cuyler, 446 U.S. a
349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19; see Thomas
818 F.2d at 480 n. 3.
The reasons for presuming prejudice ii
conflict of interest cases meeting this stan
dard, which is less rigorous than th<
Strickland test generally applicable to in
effective counsel claims, was explained ii
Strickland itself:
In Cuyler . . . [we] held that prejudice u
presumed when counsel is burdened b}
an actual conflict of interest In thos<
circumstances, counsel breaches the dutj
of loyalty, perhaps the most basic o1
counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficull
to measure the precise effect on the de
fense of representation corrupted by con
flicting interests. Given the obligatior
of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest
and the ability of trial courts to make an
early inquiry in certain situations likely
to give rise to conflicts . . . it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to
maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even
so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of
prejudice that exists for the Sixth
Amendment claims mentioned above [i.e.,
actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether]. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant
demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and that
"an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at
2067 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100
S.Ct. at 1719); accord Burger, 107 S.Ct. at
3120.
In this case, although no specific objection to joint representation of Webb and
Humphrey by two public defenders was
ever raised until after his conviction, Webb
contends that the trial court knew or
should have known about the possibility
that the defenders were representing conflicting interests and that the trial court's
failure, on its own motion, to either appoint
Webb counsel who was not a public defender or inquire further into the issue before
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or during trial violated his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct
at 1719; United States v. Akinseye, 802
F.2d 740, 744-46 (4th Cir.1986) (absent a
specific conflict objection, trial court may
assume that joint representation does not
involve any conflict unless court knows or
has reason to know that particular conflict
exists), cert, denied sub nom. Ayodcji v.
United States, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3190,
96 LEd.2d 678 (1987). Reversal and remand for a new trial are required as in
Holloway, Webb argues, because he has
demonstrated a potential conflict of interest, from which prejudice must be presumed.
In support of his argument that the trial
judge violated a sixth amendment duty to
investigate further the potential conflict of
interest, Webb contends that the following
were sufficient to bring to the trial court's
attention the potential for conflict arising
from joint representation of him and Humphrey by two attorneys from the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association (SLLDA): (1)
his March 1988 motion to sever his trial
from that of Humphrey; (2) the trial
court's appointment of the two SLLDA attorneys to represent two codefendants;
and (3) his post-conviction motion for new
trial.
[6] In Cuyler, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the representation of codefendants by a single attorney was, in and of
itself, a "special circumstance" from which
a trial judge "knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict" of interest
exists, thereby creating a duty on the court
to inquire further into the conflict. In this
case, therefore, the fact of representation
of Webb and Humphrey by two SLLDA
4. In his reply brief, Webb also alludes to Humphrey's April and May 1988 handwritten pro sc
motions, both captioned "Motions for Conflict
of Interest," as providing sufficient notice to the
trial court of a potential conflict arising from
representation of the codefendants by the two
public defenders. In his motion, Humphrey
asserted that Webb would be deprived of a fair
trial if the robbery victims were allowed to
identify Humphrey as the robber at trial since,
Humphrey claimed, their pretrial identification

attorneys is alone insufficient to impose
such a duty on the trial judge. See State
v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982) (no
presumption of prejudice arising solely
from multiple representation of codefendants by attorneys from same public defender office).
[7-9] We reach the same conclusion regarding the duty of the trial judge in this
case even when the codefendants' joint representation at trial by SLLDA lawyers is
viewed in light of the fact that the case file
contained Webb's pretrial motion to sever
his trial from Humphrey's. At the time the
motion was filed, the codefendants were
not represented by the two defenders.
Webb was still represented by a private
retained attorney and Humphrey was represented by a public defender. After Wells
was appointed to replace Stoddard as
Webb's counsel nearly three months before
trial, the codefendants did nothing to alert
the trial judge to a potential or actual conflict between them.4 There is nothing in
this record to suggest that the trial judge
actually knew of the vague, general assertions in the earlier severance motion about
the difference in the quantum of evidence
that would allegedly be presented at trial
against the codefendants. No hearing on
the severance motion was requested or
held; likewise, no ruling on the motion was
requested or obtained. In the absence of
other facts or circumstances that should
reasonably bring a conflict of interests between codefendants to the trial court's attention, we decline to hold that, for purposes of invoking the rule set forth in
Holloway and Cuyler, a trial judge "knows
or reasonably should know" before or at
trial of a conflict suggested in an abandoned pretrial severance motion. By the
time of trial, the trial judge in this case
of him was unconstitutional. The "conflict of
interest" referred to by the caption on Humphrey's motions appears to be Humphrey's disagreement with counsel over the handling of
this pretrial identification issue, which had already been argued to, but rejected by, the trial
court. In light of the court's resolution of Humphrey's claims, these motions were insufficient
to alert the trial court to any potential conflict
of interests.
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could reasonably assume that, in the face
of the State's evidence linking Webb and
Humphrey and in spite of the victims' identification of Humphrey, Webb's trial counsel had made a tactical decision not to
pursue a defense based on disassociating
Webb from Humphrey but to press a united defense—i.e., that both codefendants
were framed by the Martindales and that
the identification of Humphrey by the robbery victims was erroneous—at one trial.
There was nothing at the trial itself suggesting to the trial judge that Webb's legal
representation was in any way compromised by the other public defender's representation of Humphrey. On the contrary,
the judge could see at trial that Webb was
actively participating in the joint defense,
an affirmative indication that Webb considered the codefendants' interests as being in harmony, not in conflict.

the record in this case discloses an insuf
cient basis on which to hold that the tr
court reasonably should have known befo
or at trial that the two SLLDA attorne
were representing codefendants with co
flicting interests. We therefore conclu<
that the sixth amendment imposed no s
firmative duty on the trial judge to act si
sponte and appoint Webb a non-SLLD
attorney or inquire into the propriety of tl
representation of the codefendants by tv
public defenders from the same office.
[11] Because the alleged conflict in th
case was not adequately raised in the tri;
court until after his conviction, Webb ca
succeed on his sixth amendment ineffe<
tiveness of counsel claim only if he demor
strates both that counsel actively repr<
sented conflicting interests and that an ac
tual conflict of interest adversely affecte
his lawyer's performance. See Stricklanc
466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Unit*
States v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256, 1259-6*
(10th Cir.1984). We conclude that Web!
has failed to sustain his burden on botl
points.

[10] Finally, we reject out-of-hand
Webb's absurd contention that his post-conviction motion for new trial was the timely
"objection at trial" contemplated by Holloway, a proposition for which he cites no
supporting authority. There is no question
[12,13] In order to show an actual con
that Webb knew of the alleged conflict of flict of interest existed, a defendant mus
which he now complains no later than at point to specific instances in the record tc
trial. Although his motion for new trial suggest an actual conflict or impairment o\
could be regarded as sufficient to preserve his or her interests. Thomas, 818 F.2d at
for consideration in this direct appeal his 481; Bumey, 756 F.2d at 792. There is nc
ineffectiveness of counsel claim arising violation where the conflict is irrelevant or
from counsel's representation of purported- merely hypothetical; there must be an acly conflicting interests, see People v. Prec- tual, significant conflict. Thomas, 818
up, 73 IlL2d 7, 21 Ill.Dec. 863, 382 N.E.2d F.2d at 481.
227 (1978); but see Armstrong v. People,
Appellants must make a factual showing
701 P.2d 17, 21 (Colo. 1985) (issue can be
of inconsistent interests and must demconsidered on direct appeal even if not
onstrate that the attorney "made a
raised in new trial motion), it was untimely
choice between possible alternative
for purposes of invoking the Holloway aucourses of action
If he did not make
tomatic reversal rule, which is based on a
such a choice, the conflict remained hypotrial judge's failure to act once on notice
thetical."
An actual conflict of interthat there was a possible conflict of interest exists when the respective defenses
ests between jointly represented codefendof multiple defendants are inconsistent,
ants.
i.e., if "introduction of probative evidence
or plausible arguments that would signifUnlike the pretrial and trial objections of
icantly benefit one defendant would damthe defendant in Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484,
age the defense of another defendant
98 S.Ct. at 1178, described by the Court as
whom the same counsel is representing."
"focused explicitly on the probable risk of a
conflict of interests" between defendants United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328
represented by a single defense attorney, (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert denied,
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464 U.S. 991, 104 S.Ct. 481, 78 L.Ed.2d 679
(1983). Until a defendant shows an actual
conflict, "he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350,
100 S.Ct. at 1719.

where jointly tried codefendants in rape
trial both used consent defense).
[151 Furthermore, even if we were to
conclude that the difference in the nature
of the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated an actual conflict of interest, Webb
has failed to demonstrate that it resulted in
any adverse effect on his counsel's performance. He merely asserts that the conflict caused his attorney not to pursue a
nonunited defense at a separate trial and
assumes that this is sufficient to demonstrate an adverse effect. Faced with such
a claim of omission, however, a reviewing
court must determine from the record (1)
whether the arguments or actions allegedly
omitted would likely have been made by
other counsel, and (2) whether there was a
tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict) for the omission. People v. Easley,
46 Cal.3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 498-99, 250
Cal.Rptr. 855 (1988).

[14] Webb asserts that an actual conflict was demonstrated by his trial attorney's pursuit of a united defense with
Humphrey at a joint trial "in spite of the
evidence and Webb's desire to impeach the
testimony of his codefendant." We disagree. This is not a case in which the
evidence produced against Webb was wholly circumstantial, while that against his
codefendant was direct. Nor is this a case
in which the codefendants' interests actually conflicted because of a substantial disparity of evidence incriminating each defendant, as in Armstrong, 701 P.2d at 22.
Although there was eyewitness victim testimony identifying Humphrey, not Webb,
as the robber in the store, the Martindales
There is absolutely nothing in the record
testified to Webb's direct involvement beto
suggest that counsel's choice of the unitfore and immediately after the crime. The
ed
defense strategy, which Webb apparenttwo codefendants took the stand and gave
entirely consistent, corroborative testimony ly supported enthusiastically until it proto support their claim that the Martindales duced an unfavorable verdict, was in any
were the real culprits while they were only way prompted by a desire or effort to
patsies. Webb's counsel aggressively chal- bolster Humphrey's defense at Webb's exlenged the reliability of the robbery vic- pense. Any reasonably competent counsel
tims' identification of Humphrey as the representing Webb but not Humphrey
would not have chosen any different derobber.
fense strategy. Webb would likely have
Under these circumstances, we are con- gained nothing by abandoning the common
vinced that counsel's loyalty was not divid- defense and challenging Humphrey's credied between Webb and a codefendant with bility at a separate trial. On the record
actual conflicting interests. See United before us, counsel simply had no other
States v. Cantu, 786 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.) defense options to pursue, and Webb has
(per curiam) (no conflict where jointly rep- suggested none. The frame-up defense,
resented codefendants charged with con- coupled with an attack on the robbery vicspiracy to file false tax returns pursued tims' ability to make a reliable identificajoint defense claiming that neither party tion of Humphrey, was the only viable defiled fraudulent returns), cert, denied, 479 fense tactic available to Webb in light of
U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 169, 93 L.Ed.2d 106 the State's evidence, including Britt Martin(1986); Mersf 701 F.2d at 1329 (no conflict dale's testimony placing Humphrey and
where codefendants pressed same defense Webb together at her home with the jeweland corroborated each other); Government ry and shotgun shortly after the robbery.
of Canal Zone v. Hodges, 589 F.2d 207 (5th Therefore, there was a tactical reason, othCir.) (joint alibi defense), cert, denied, 441 er than multiple representation of Webb
U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2173, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 and Humphrey, underlying the decision to
(1979); Wright v. State, 442 So.2d 301 (Fla. pursue the united defense strategy at a
Dist.Ct.App. 1983) (no conflict of interest joint trial.
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As the United Suites Supreme Court
pointed out in rejecting any per se rule that
would prohibit a single attorney from ever
representing codefendants, "in some cases,
certain advantages might accrue from joint
representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: 'Joint representation is a means
of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives
strength against a common attack.' " Hoiloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. at 117778 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 92, 62 S.Ct. 457, 475, 86 L.Ed. 680
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Because Webb has failed to demonstrate
an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his attorney's performance, we
reject his claim of ineffective counsel and
conclude that the trial court properly denied Webb's motion for a new trial.

A. Execution of Arrest Warrants
[16] We next consider Webb's attacks
on the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress the shotgun, the ring, and the
diamond watch. He first contends that the
seizure of these items violated his fourth
amendment rights because the arrest warrants for him, Humphrey, and Gregersen,
which form the basis for the lawful presence of the police officers in the apartment,
were not executed in the manner prescribed by the prior demand requirements
in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-7-6, -8 (1982).5
In essence, Webb argues that any search
of the apartment following an arrest in
which the arrest warrants were executed in
a manner violating these statutes is per se
unreasonable under the fourth amendment,

requiring application of the exclusioi
rule.
However, this statutory noncomplh
issue was not raised or argued to the
court as one of the grounds in suppor
defendant's motion to suppress, either
fore or at trial. As a result, the trial c<
made no ruling on whether sections 77and -8 were violated and it made no f
ings to resolve discrepancies in the testi
ny at the suppression hearing on fac
questions critical to the statutory none
pliance issue, such as whether demand
explanation were actually given, whet
there was a "breaking" of the apartm
door, and whether there were facts cor
tuting an exception to the demand requ
ments.
As the Utah appellate courts have r
erated many times, we generally will
consider an issue, even a constitutional c
which the appellant raises on appeal for
first time. Kg., State v. Anderson,
Utah Adv.Rep. 15, 16 (1990); Jolivet
Cook, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. 17, 19 (1989) (c
el and unusual punishment claim); Statt
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 19
(per curiam) (probable cause to stop
hide); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92,
(Utah 1983) (speedy trial right); State
rel. M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct.App.19
(constitutionality of statute). This princi]
of appellate review has been applied
fourth amendment challenges to the adrr
sion of evidence: "[WJhere a defend?
fails to assert a particular ground for si
pressing unlawfully obtained evidence
the trial court, an appellate court will r
consider that ground on appeal." State
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); <
cord State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d IS

5. Section 77-7-8 provides:
To make an arrest, a private person, if the
offense is a felony, and in all cases, a peace
officer, may break the door or window of the
building in which the person to be arrested is,
or in which there are reasonable grounds for
believing him to be. Before making the
break, the person shall demand admission
and explain the purpose for which admission
is desired. Demand and explanation need not
be given before breaking under the exceptions
in section 77-7-6 or where there is reason to
believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed.

Insofar as it is relevant to the situation prese
ed in this case, section 77-7-6 does away w
the prior demand and explanation requirem*
when
(1) There is reason to believe the notice u
endanger the life or safety of the officer
another person or will likely enable the pai
being arrested to escapef.)
A similar argument involving police complian
with the knock-and-announcc statute applicat
to executions of search warrants. Utah Co
Ann. § 77-23-10(2) (1982), was considered I
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Buck, 7
P.2d 700 (Utah 1988).
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126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v.
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct.App.
1989). The Carter court relied on State v.
Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595
(1981), in which it pointed out that suppression motions should be supported by precise averments, not conclusory generalizations, and held that, in the absence of special circumstances, the appellate court will
not rule on available grounds not addressed
in the trial court Lee, 633 P.2d at 53; see
Utah R.Crim.P. 12(a) (grounds for a motion
must be stated "with particularity"). "[T]o
entertain the point now would be to sanction the practice of withholding positions
that should properly be presented to the
trial court but which may be withheld for
purposes of seeking a reversal on appeal
and a new trial or dismissal." Carter, 707
P.2d at 661 (quoting Lee, 633 P.2d at 53).
Exceptions to this general rule consist of
those cases in which there are "exceptional
circumstances" for the failure to raise the
issue below, Jolivet, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. at
19, or cases where the plain error rule is
applicable, Anderson, 129 Utah Adv.Rep.
at 16; State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1311 (Utah 1987); cf. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983) (stating that the exception applies where a "liberty interest" is at stake). In this case,
there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the statutory noncompliance ground
now asserted by Webb was unknown or
unavailable to him before or at trial. He
has not contended that the plain error exception should apply or that any special
circumstances justify his failure to present
this particular ground for the motion to
suppress to the trial court, nor do we perceive any in the record. We, therefore, will
not consider the statutory noncompliance
challenge to the validity of the seizure of
the evidence, which he raises here for the
first time. See Carter, 707 P.2d at 661.
6. A warrantless seizure justified on the basis of
the "plain view" exception requires: (1) the lawful presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain
view; and (3) evidence which is clearly incriminating. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah
1986); State v. Holmes. 11A P.2d 506. 510 (Utah

B. Shotgun
[171 Webb contends that, even if the
officers were lawfully present in his apartment for purposes of making the arrests,
the warrantless search of the bedroom in
which he was arrested, which led to the
seizure of the shotgun, was unlawful because it was not incident to his arrest. The
factual premise for this argument is that
the gun was not observed and seized until
the officers re-entered that bedroom after
Webb had been arrested and taken from
the room. Once he was taken from the
bedroom in handcuffs, Webb argues, the
bedroom was not "an area within his immediate control," State v. Harris, 671 P.2d
175, 180 (Utah 1983), that could be re-entered and searched for weapons. The
State accepts this factual premise and contends that the shotgun was seized in plain
view' when the police officers, after arresting Webb pursuant to an arrest warrant, re-entered the bedroom as part of a
"protective sweep" to search for other dangerous persons on the premises, see Maryland v. Buie, — U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1093,
108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), prior to conducting
their intensive search of the apartment pursuant to Gregersen's consent.
We, however, have carefully reviewed
the record of the suppression hearings and
find insufficient support in the evidence for
Webb's version of the events leading to the
seizure of the shotgun. Detective Dalling,
who was one of the officers who arrested
Webb and then was involved in securing
the written consent from Gregersen, made
clear that the shotgun had already been
located prior to her consent to search the
entire premises, although he was not the
officer who located the shotgun. In response to questioning from attorney Stoddard—who appeared confused about
whether Webb and Humphrey had been
found in the same bedroom, but in a different bedroom from the one in which the
Ct.App.1989). Webb does not dispute the presence of the last two elements of the plain view
doctrine. Instead, he asserts only that the re-entry of the police into his bedroom once he had
been removed from it was unlawful.

shotgun was found—Detective Dalling also
indicated that he had located Webb prior to
the shotgun being found. Counsel asked
no further questions on this point to clarify
which of several officers present in Webb's
bedroom to arrest him had located the shotgun and whether it had been located during
the time the officers were lawfully present
to effectuate the arrest, even if it was not
physically seized until Webb was secured
and removed to another room. There is
simply no evidence that, with Webb in
handcuffs, all the arresting officers left the
room totally unaware of the shotgun and
then returned to that room later and discovered the shotgun in plain view for the
first time. From the testimony presented,
it appears that the shotgun was located
while the officers were lawfully present in
the room to arrest Webb. We therefore
reject Webb's contentions and conclude
that, on the evidence before it, the trial
court did not err in admitting the shotgun
into evidence.

Utah

gersen's purse was not incident to her
ful arrest and that Gregersen's wri
consent to search the premises was ir
untary because she was coerced and ui
duress, mostly out of fear for her
dren's safety. The State then went
ward with testimony from the arres
officers concerning the facts surroum
the arrests, the search of Gregers<
purse in conjunction with her arrest,
the subsequent obtaining of Gregers<
written consent to search the entire prei
es.

The State responds that Webb failed to
establish his standing to raise either of
these two distinct fourth amendment
claims and that, even if we conclude Webb
has standing to challenge the admissibility
of the ring, he loses on the merits because
Gregersen voluntarily consented to the
search of the apartment.
At the first suppression hearing, Webb's
counsel contended that the search of Gre-

According to the officers' testimc
they encountered Gregersen immediat
upon entering the apartment. She \
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and
quired to kneel on the living room flo
Her purse, apparently lying nearby, v
searched for weapons by one of the arre
ing officers. Her infant son was placed
a small crib on the floor next to her. S
remained in the living room, agitated a
crying, for six or seven minutes while t
officers arrested the other two suspec
Gregersen was then allowed to stand
and move to a chair at the kitchen tah
Her older son called her sister to come a
take custody of the children. The office
then began asking her questions. Aft
determining that she paid rent on t
apartment, they requested her consent
search the apartment, explaining that th<
were looking for weapons and for jewel
taken in the robbery and that she did n
need to sign the consent form. She wi
also permitted to smoke, drink coffee, ar
use the bathroom. When Gregersen toe
the stand, she stated that her jewelry ws
kept in her jewelry box on her dresser i
the master bedroom, but she did not dii
pute the arresting officer's testimony cor
cerning the search of her purse. She als
claimed that she was upset by the police'
armed entry, that the police would not le
her hold her crying infant son, and that sh<
did not remember signing any consen
form or talking to the officers about \
search of the premises.

7. Webb docs not contend that Gregersen lacked
the power to consent to the search of the apart-

ment or the master bedroom in which the jewel
ry box was located.

C. Jewelry
Webb next challenges the admission into
evidence of the diamond watch and the
ring. He disputes the legality of the warrantless search of Gregersen's purse,
which ultimately resulted in the seizure of
the diamond watch, by asserting that it
was not incident to her lawful arrest since
she was already handcuffed when the
purse was searched. He also contends that
the subsequent warrantless search of the
apartment, during which the ring was
found in a jewelry box on the dresser in the
master bedroom, was illegal because Gregersen did not voluntarily consent to it.7
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In his supplemental motion to suppress,
Webb renewed his challenge to the legality
of the search of the premises that led to
the discovery of the ring. This time, his
motion was grounded on Gregersen's claim
that the signature on the consent form was
not, in fact, her signature. At the start of
the evidentiary hearing, Webb himself took
the stand as the moving party for the limited purpose, according to his counsel, of
"establishing his residence and standing to
bring [the] motion." In testimony that the
State did not controvert, Webb stated that
he resided at the apartment he shared with
Gregersen, along with their infant child;
he was actually living there on the date the
arrest warrants were executed and the
premises searched; and he monetarily contributed to the support of their household
by paying half the utility bills and over half
the rent He did not testify to any interest
in the purse searched or in the diamond
watch seized from that purse.
[18,19) Because fourth
amendment
rights are personal rights which may not
be vicariously asserted, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961,
967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), the proponent
of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that his own fourth amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421,
424 n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A person
who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of
a third person's premises or property has
not had any of his fourth amendment
rights infringed. Id. at 134, 99 S.Ct. at
425. "And since the exclusionary rule is an
attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit
only defendants whose Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated to benefit from
the rule's protections." Id. Therefore, the
central inquiry in any suppression hearing
grounded on a purportedly illegal search is
whether the defendant challenging the admission of evidence has shown a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place." United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83, 91-92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2552-53, 65

L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (quoting Rakas, 439
U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. at 428). The inquiry is
the same whether whether the challenged
search is of premises, such as the apartment in Salvucci, or of a tangible object,
such as the glove box in Rakas or the
purse in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98 at 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556 at 2561, 65
L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). Sec also United
States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.),
cert, denied, — U.S.
, 109 S.Ct. 1742,
104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1988) (search of travel
bags).
[20-22] As this court recently pointed
out, there is no bright line test to use in
making this fact-sensitive determination.
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah
CtApp.) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143,
99 S.Ct. at 430), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53
(Utah 1989). A legitimate expectation of
privacy incorporates two elements: first,
whether the defendant "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation lof privacy," and
second, whether that subjective expectation
is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Knox, 839 F.2d at 293
(quoting United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d
1041, 1044 (6th Cir.1982), cert, denied, 464
U.S. 933, 104 S.Ct. 337, 78 L.Ed.2d 306
(1983)); accord California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 212, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1812, 90
L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). Factors relevant to
this inquiry include whether the defendant
had any possessory or proprietary interest
in the place searched or the item seized in
the challenged search; was legitimately on
the premises; had the right to exclude others from that place; exhibited a subjective
expectation that the place would remain
free from governmental invasion; or took
normal precautions to maintain his privacy.
United States v. Haydcl, 649 F.2d 1152,
1155 (5th Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1022, 102 S.Ct. 1721, 72 L.Ed.2d 140 (1982).
A defendant's ownership or possession of
an item seized in the allegedly unlawful
search is not determinative of whether that
individual's fourth amendment privacy
rights in the place searched have been infringed. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct.
at 2553; see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12,
99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12. On the other hand, a
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defendant who establishes a privacy interest in the place searched sufficient to contest the legality of that search, in order to
suppress evidence seized as a product of it,
is not deprived of fourth amendment standing to assert that claim merely because
another person actually owns either the
evidentiary items actually seized or the personal effect in which the seized items were
found. See, e.g., Alderman, 394 U.S. at
176-77, 89 S.Ct. at 968-69; United States
v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.1983), cert,
denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82
L.Ed.2d 884 (1984); United States v. Aikens, 685 F.Supp. 732, 736 (D.Ha.1988);
People v. Koury, 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 262
Cal.Rptr. 870, 874-75 (1989); People v.
Whisler, 724 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Colo. 1986)
(Lohr, J., concurring specially); see generally 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 11.3(a) (1987).
In Perez, the court concluded that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his own house sufficient to allow
him to challenge the constitutionality of the
search of the house—with the goal of suppressing incriminating items seized during
the course of that challenged search—even
though the incriminating items were found
in a search of handbags and luggage belonging to his houseguests. Perez, 700
F.2d at 1236. The United States Supreme
Court explained the rationale for such a
result in Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176-77, 89
S.Ct. at 968-69:
If the police make an unwarranted
search of a house and seize tangible
property belonging to third parties . . .
the homeowner may object to its use
against him, not because he had any interest in the seized items as "effects"
protected by the Fourth Amendment, but
because they were the fruits of an unauthorized search of his house, which is
itself expressly protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
Webb's fourth amendment claim concerning the ring is similar to that of defendant
Perez. See Perez, 700 F.2d at 1235-36.
Webb contends his personal privacy rights
were violated by a warrantless search of
his home; consequently, evidence found in
that search (i.e., the ring in the jewelry

box) should be suppressed. To succeed, he
must first show a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the "invaded place," i.e., the
apartment, as required by Saltmcci.
His claim concerning the diamond watch,
however, is very different. He does not
contend that the search of Gregersen's
purse was the fruit of the purportedly unconstitutional search of his apartment or
any part thereof. In this case, such a
contention would be untenable since the
search of the purse in conjunction with
Gregersen's arrest preceded the independently challenged search of the apartment.
Instead, Webb seeks to challenge a separate search of a tangible object that took
place in the living room of the apartment
while the police officers were legally
present to execute an unchallenged arrest
warrant. Thus, insofar as Webb's motion
to suppress the diamond watch is concerned, the "invaded place" in which Webb
must preliminarily show a legitimate expectation of privacy is the purse, not the apartment.
[23] With this important distinction in
mind, we conclude that Webb has standing
to contest the legality of the extensive,
two-hour search of the apartment. The
state did not controvert his testimony that
he actually resided there with Gregersen
and their child, in a "common law marriage," and that he contributed to household expenses, including rent. From this it
can reasonably be inferred that, as a coresident, he had the right to exclude all others
except Gregersen from the apartment. He
identified the master bedroom, in which the
jewelry box containing the ring was located, as "our" bedroom, implying that it was
used by him and Gregersen. We conclude
that Webb established his legitimate and
reasonable expectation of privacy in the
apartment as his home, including the master bedroom. Because the challenged governmental search of the master bedroom
and the rest of the apartment infringed on
Webb's personal fourth amendment rights,
he may contest the legality of that search
with the goal of preventing the admission
of the ring as evidence.
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[24-27] On the merits of that issue,
however, Webb fails.
A warrantless
search conducted pursuant to a consent
that is voluntary in fact does not violate
the fourth amendment. Schvcckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct.
2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). It is the
State's burden to prove that consent given
to a search was voluntary. United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct.
1870, 1879, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). Voluntariness is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
557, 100 S.Ct. at 1878; United States v.
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir.
1986). We deferentially review a trial
court's finding of voluntary consent, like
other factual determinations underlying
the denial of a motion to suppress, disturbing it only if the appellant demonstrates
that there has been clear error.
United
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st
Cir.1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99
S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). We
do so because of the trial court's more
favorable position to assess the credibility
of witnesses and resolve conflicting testimony. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258; State v.
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah CtApp.
1989). A finding is clearly erroneous if "it
is 'against the clear weight of the evidence,
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' " State v. Goodman,
763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
However, in evaluating whether a finding
of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous,
we are not unmindful of the analysis in
which a reviewing court must engage to
insure that the State has met its burden of
proof on this issue:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the government must
prove consent was given without duress
or coercion, express or implied; and (3)
the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of funda-

mental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such
rights were waived.
United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885
(10th Cir.1977) (quoting Villano v. United
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962));
accord Carson, 793 F.2d at 1150; United
States v. Mcdlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.
1988).
[28,29] When the evidence presented to
the trial court is measured against these
standards, we are satisfied that the State
carried its burden of proof on the voluntariness question, and we conclude that there
is no clear error here. The fact that Gregersen was under arrest when her consent
was given, although one relevant factor,
does not preclude a finding that her consent to search the premises was voluntary.
See United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d
1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1988). Gregersen
was concerned for her children and upset
by the officers' armed entry into her home,
but there is no evidence that the officers
continued to brandish their weapons once
the three suspects were arrested. Her infant son was placed near her to alleviate
her fears for him. Six or seven minutes
after her arrest, she was allowed to get up
from the floor and move to the kitchen
table, where the police began talking to
her. The fact that she was allowed to
drink coffee and use the bathroom upon
request and that she was not denied any
other reasonable request suggests that the
atmosphere in the kitchen at that time was
not coercive or threatening. An officer
told her that they were looking for weapons and for jewelry taken in the robbery
and asked for her consent, which he told
her she did not have to give. He also
explained that, if she did not consent to the
warrantless search, it would not be conducted. Gregersen did not testify to any
overt or implied threats to her own well-being or that of Webb or her children. There
is no evidence that she merely acquiesced
to the will of the police because she was
already under arrest or because she believed they would do it anyway. She was
shown the straightforward consent-tosearch form by the officer who testified

that she read it. She asked no questions
about it, and indicated no reservations
about signing it. The preprinted form she
signed contains statements that the police
informed her of her constitutional right not
to have a warrantless search made of her
premises or property; she knew of her
lawful right to refuse to consent to such a
search; she willingly gave her permission
to the officers "to conduct a complete
search of the premises and property" located at her address and apartment number;
and she did so "without any threats or
promises of any kind." Gregersen never
claimed that she signed the written consent
form only out of fear or coercion or that
she misunderstood it; instead, she testified
that she did not remember signing the
form or discussing the consent with the
officers. Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the finding of
voluntary consent to the search of the
premises was clearly erroneous. Thus, the
trial court properly denied Webb's motion
to suppress the ring found in the search of
the apartment.

object in which Webb asserted no interest.
The only evidence favoring Webb on this
standing issue is that the purse belonged to
a person with whom he had an intimate
relationship and that the purse and its contents were in his home when the challenged
search occurred.
Webb is in the same position as the defendant husband in United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1989), a
case relied on by the State and ignored by
Webb. In Garcia-Rosa, the court noted
that the United States Supreme Court has
never recognized a standing doctrine that
would permit even a spouse to vicariously
assert the fourth amendment rights of the
other spouse. The court of appeals held
that the defendant husband had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
search of a box belonging to his wife—
which was lawfully seized in the couple's
home while the police were lawfully
present in the couple's master bedroom—
because of the husband's failure to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the box. Id. at 219. On that
issue, the court in Garcia-Rosa did not
consider as determinative the fact that the
box was within the four walls of the couple's home when searched. The Colorado
Supreme Court likewise concluded that a
defendant had failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's suitcase, even though the suitcase
was found in a consent search of the apartment in which they both lived. Whisler,
724 P.2d at 650. An expectation of privacy
in a room, the Colorado court held, does not
extend to another person's locked suitcase
within that room. Id.

[30,31] Returning to the matter of
Webb's standing to contest the constitutionality of the prior search of the purse,
we conclude that Webb failed to establish
that he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the purse at the time it was
searched. There is no evidence, nor even
any argument, that Webb owned the purse,
that he had ever sought or been given
access to Gregersen's purse, or that he had
ever put any of his own effects in it. See
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-06, 100 S.Ct. at
2561-62. At the time of the search, the
purse was in proximity to Gregersen in the
living room area, while Webb was in another room. Thus, we are left with an object
belonging to Webb's mate, in which Webb
asserted no interest, which was searched in
conjunction with her lawful arrest by police
whose presence in the apartment was not
the product of an illegal invasion of Webb's
privacy rights, leading to the seizure of an

We likewise conclude that the fact that
Gregersen's purse was within the confines
of the apartment Webb shared with Gregersen, premises in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy, is alone insufficient to establish his legitimate expectation of privacy in Gregersen's purse.8 We

8. Wc recognize that the court in Perez summarily concluded that a defendant homeowner had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the luggage
and handbags of his houscgucsts simply because
he "should have been able to expect that any

personal property brought into the house by his
overnight guests would be free from government intrusion." Perez. 700 F.2d at 1236. However, this conclusion appears to be dictum since
Perez was contesting the admission of the con-
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do not believe that a defendant's privacy
interest in a common residence necessarily
extends to a privacy interest in every object located inside that residence. See
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725,
104 S.Ct. 3296, 3308, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Although it is
possible that Webb could have shown a
legitimate expectation of privacy in Gregersen's purse, he did not meet his burden of
proof on this point.
Because Webb failed to show that his
personal fourth amendment rights were infringed when the arresting officers invaded
Gregersen's purse—conduct which we
stress was not the product of any predicate
illegality violating Webb's fourth amendment rights, sec Whiter, 724 P.2d at 65051 (Lohr, J., concurring); see also note 8,
supra —he may not challenge the legality
of the search of the purse in order to
prevent admission of the diamond watch at
trial.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
[32] Webb next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The standard of appellate review applicable to such a claim is well settled. We
review the evidence and all inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989), reversing a jury conviction only
when the evidence, so viewed, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." Id. at 124 (quoting State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985));
accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128
(Utah 1989); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271
(Utah Ct.App.1989). "So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably
tents of his houscguests' effects as the product
of a purportedly unconstitutional search of his
own home. He was not independently contesting the seizure or search of those effects by
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be made, our inquiry stops." Booker, 709
P.2d at 345.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)
(1978), a person commits aggravated robbery if, in the course of committing robbery, he or she
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or
a deadly weapon;I9' or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another.
One may be convicted as an accomplice if,
acting with the mental state required for
the commission of the offense, he or she
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
(1978).
Webb does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the jury's finding of all the elements of an armed robbery
in which Humphrey was the principal actor.
Indeed, Webb does not really contend that
the physical and testimonial evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of his participation as an accomplice in the crime.
Instead, he argues that we should disregard all the evidence that supports his
conviction as an accomplice in this armed
robbery, while his conflicting testimony
and the physical evidence supporting his
alibi defense, a receipt issued by a gas
station in Ely, Nevada, at which Gregersen's son worked, should be viewed as if it
were the only credible evidence presented
at trial. This is not, however, our role. It
is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. Booker, 709
P.2d at 345; State r. Tolman, 775 I\2d
422, 424 (Utah Ct.App.). cert, denied. 783
P.2d 53 (1989).
Russell Martindale testified that Webb
had solicited him to steal the car eventually
used as the getaway vehicle in the robbery,
in which a sawed-off shotgun was used by
the robber. Russell stole the car and
police who were lawfully present on the premises.
9. This provision was recently amended.
text at note 10, infra.

See

turned it over to Webb in Salt Lake City
the day before the robbery. Clothing items
matching the description of those worn by
the robber were found in that car. The
night of the robbery, Webb told Russell
that he knew someone in Las Vegas who
could get rid of the "stuff" he and Humphrey had stolen. According to Britt Martindale's testimony, Webb appeared at her
home shortly after the robbery on October
21, 1987, with the man later identified as
the robber in the trunk of his car. Webb
removed a canvas bag and a sawed-off
shotgun from his trunk and took them into
her house, where he emptied the bag and
sorted through currency and jewelry later
found at Webb's apartment and identified
by the store owner as some of the items
stolen from him. Webb told Britt that
everything had gone great and that the
police had not shown up for a little while.
He stashed the canvas bag in her kitchen
and told her not to disturb it. When he
returned later to retrieve the bag, he told
her he planned to dispose of it in the river.
Viewing this testimony and all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, Verde, 770 P.2d at 124, we
conclude there was substantial evidence
upon which the jury could reasonably find
that Webb solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Humphrey in the aggravated robbery of the
jewelry store with the requisite intent.
That evidence is not so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that Webb committed the crime of aggravated robbery. Although there was conflicting evidence presented in support of
the defense theory that Webb and Humphrey were innocent victims of a set-up by
the Martindales, which, if believed, would
have placed Webb in Ely, Nevada, the day
before, and the day of, the robbery, the
jury was not obligated to believe that evidence. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,
1056 (Utah 1985).
OTHER CLAIMS OF TRIAL ERROR
After careful consideration of the other
claimed errors on appeal, which Webb as-

serts require the reversal of his conviction
and remand for a new trial, we conclude
that they are meritless and that discussion
of them is unnecessary. Sec Carter, 776
P.2d at 888.
SENTENCE
(331 The trial judge sentenced Webb to
serve an indeterminate prison term of five
years to life for the armed robbery conviction, a first degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302(2) (1978); cf. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978) (robbery is a second
degree felony). He also added one mandatory year for use of a firearm and a discretionary five years for use of a firearm,
each to run consecutively to the sentence
of five years to life. The court enhanced
the penalties pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203(1) (Supp.1989), which provides:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first
degree, for a term at not less than five
years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or
facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or the
furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrentlyf.]
The mandatory enhancement provision was
added to the statute by 1977 Utah Laws,
ch. 88, § 1; the discretionary enhancement
provision was added by 1976 Utah Laws,
ch. 9, § 1. This statute has been upheld as
a valid exercise of legislative authority that
neither creates a separate offense nor imposes double punishment for the same
criminal act. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992,
995 (Utah 1978). As the Angus court explained, the legislature has the authority to
increase the degree of a crime where "instruments of violence" were used in its
commission, and to increase the punish-
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firearm enhancement statute 18 U S C
§ 924(c), where the statute setting forth
the elements of bank robbery, 18 U S C
§ 2113(a) included an enhancement provi
sion for a bank robbery committed "bv the
use of a dangerous weapon or device
18
U S C § 2113(d) We believe Simpson is
distinguishable
First the starting point
for the court's construction of the fedcril
statutes was its holding that section 921(c)
created a separate offense from that in the
underKmg federal felony Sunpson 4T>
U S at 10 98 SCt at 912 Thus the
Simpson court would have had to decide a
double jeopardy issue if it had interpreted
the general firearm enhancement stitute
as applicable to bank robberies committed
using a firearm
In contrast, the Utah
enhancement statute has been interpreted
in Angus as not creating a separate of
fense from the underlying felony, therebv
Webb contends that, under accepted pnn
eliminating any double jeopardy concerns
)les of statutorv construction, the fire
based on being tried twice for the same
m enhancement statute does not apply at offense which in any event, Webb has not
I to his armed robbery conviction because raised Second the statutory scheme in
s sentence was already "enhanced" to Simpson involved a specific enhancement
at for a first degree felony as a result of provision for bank robbery committed with
e use of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous weapon Here the use of a
e robbery He asserts that the legisla
firearm is one clement of the substantive
re's 1975 amendment of the armed rob
crime of armed robbery as defined in the
ry statute to specify use of a firearm, version of section 76-6-302(1 )(a) in effect
upled with the subsequent enactment of when Webb was convicted, that section is
e general enhancement provisions, leads not an enhancement provision Third the
an ambiguity about whether the legisla
Simpson court relied heavily on the legisla
re intended the latter to apply to aggra
tive intent it found in the public comments
ited robbery
Such an ambiguity, he of the sponsor of section 924(c), the general
aims, should be resolved in favor of leni
enhancement statute for firearm use in fed
See State ? Egbert, 748 P 2d 558, 562 eral felonies to the effect that it would not
3 (Utah 1987) Furthermore, the more applv to section 21H armed bank robber
Here the parties have referred to
>ecific statute governing robbery with the ies
>e of a firearm should control over the nothing indicating that the legislature in
tended the general sentence enhancement
ore general enhancement statute
provisions of seetion 76-3-20 J(l) to not ip
Webb relies exclusively on Simpsoyi v
ntted States, 435 U S 6, 98 S Ct 909, 55 plv to aggravated robbery committed with
Ed 2d 70 (1978), m which the United a firearm Indeed, we find legislative in
.ates Supreme Court refused to permit tent to the contrary in the recent amend,0
le sentencing court to enhance the penalty ment of the aggravated robbery statute
>r bank robbery using the general federal that eliminated specific reference to a fire
nt for the use of specific deadlv weap
5 considered more dangerous than oth
> /tf at 994-95 More recently, in St ate
Spccr, 750 P 2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), the
ah Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
hancement is merely part of the penalty
sed on the specific type of weapon used
Before 1975, a person committed aggra
ted robbery pursuant to Utah Code Ann
76-6-302(1 )(a) if he or she, in the course
committing a robbery, <4use[d] a deadly
»apon" Utah Laws 1973, ch 196,
76-6-302 The subsection was amended
1975 to the form in effect at the time of
ebb's conviction, i e a person committed
gravated robbery if he or she, in the
urse of committing robbery, "use[d] a
earm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or
facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon "
ah Code Ann § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (1978)

I Although this change was enacted by Utah
Laws 1989 ch 170 § 7 (effective April 24
1989) after the robbcrv and conviction at issue
in this case we may consider the legislature s
action in 1989 as persuasive evidence on the
issue of whether, in the prc-1989 version of

section 76-6-302(1 )(a) the legislature intended
to single out nggnsitcd robbery committed
uith a firearm for anv kind of special scntenc
ing treatment See State v Bishop 753 P 2d
439 486 (Utah 1988)

arm or knife and retained only the general
term "dangerous weapon " Utah Code Ann
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp 1989), as do the stat
utes setting forth the elements of other
"aggravated" crimes, eg, Utah Code Ann
§ 76-5-103 (Supp 1989) (aggravated as
sault) Utah Code Ann § 76-6-203 (Supp
1989) (aggravated burglary)
We agree
with the State that this change to conform
the language of the aggravated robbery
statute evinces the legislature's intent that
the sentence enhancement provision apply
uniformly to all aggravated crimes, includ
ing aggravated robbery
Although it is unclear why the legisla
ture amended section 76-6-302(l)(a) in 1975
to add the specific term ' firearm" to the
aggravated robbery statute since robbery
committed with a firearm was already cov
ered by the general term ' deadly weapon"
retained in the subsection, we conclude that
the amendment created no ambiguity over
what penalty the legislature intended for
robbery committed with a firearm
The
legislature was merely increasing the de
gree of a robbery committed with the enu
merated instruments of violence
In its
subsequent adoption of the enhancement
provision for firearm use in the commission
of a first degree felonv, the legislature
exercised its authority to determine that,
because firearms are more dangerous than
knives or other deadly weapons, their use
was more deserving of enhanced punishment
See Angus, 581 P 2d at 994-95
Finally, Webb asserts that, even if the
enhancement provisions of section 7 6 - 3 203(1) are applicable to his aggravated rob
bery conviction the trial court erroneously
imposed a total of six years as the term of
enhancement Based on the Utah Supreme
Court's interpretation of the firearm en
hancement statute as providing for a maxi
mum enhancement term of five years,
State v Willett, 694 P 2d 601 (Utah 1984),
the State concedes that the trial court erro
neously imposed a six year enhancement
term
We, therefore, direct the trial court upon
remand to reduce the enhancement sen
tence for use of a firearm in the commis
sion of the first degree felony of aggrava

ted robber} from a total of six vears to a
total of five vears With this correction of
the sentence, Webb's conviction is af
firmed
BENCH, J , and J ROBERT
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge
concur
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Driver was convicted in the Sixth Cir
cuit Court, Sevier County David L Mower,
J , of being in actual physical control of
vehicle while having blood alcohol level
of 217' Driver appealed The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J , held that (1) city ordi
nance under which driver was convicted
was consistent with statutes, and (2) driver
was in actual, physical control of truck
while he was sleeping
Affirmed

1 Criminal Law <£=254 2, 260 11(3)
Stipulated facts were not function il
equivalent of findings of fact, and, thus
Court of Appeals was not required to defer
to trial court's findings
2 Automobiles <&=316
Municipal Corporations <£=>592(2)
Statutory prohibition against driving
or being in actual physical control of ve
hide with blood alcohol content of 08^ or
greater as shown by chemical test given
within two hours after alleged operation or

